Myanmar presents a perplexing case of a state that played a prominent role in global and regional affairs soon after its independence from colonial rule, but today it is mired in protracted internal conflicts and struggles to remain visible internationally. There is no dearth of literature elucidating the entrenched nature of Myanmar’s complex conflict dynamics and its ties with the outside world. Despite the rich body of work on Myanmar’s prolonged conflicts and its external role and engagements, a dimension that has not received much attention in existing literature is: How the emergence of regions impacted Myanmar’s identity and its internal conflict dynamics? This article views Myanmar through the lens of ‘in-between space’ and explores the process of regionalism in the making of ‘in-between space’ and the impacts of ‘in-betweenness.’ The notion of ‘in-between space’ is employed in various disciplines such as in the field of architecture, where ‘in-between spaces’ are viewed as ‘transitional spaces’ (Tzortzi 2024, 6685-6686) that lie on the boundary of two spaces, where the edge blurs the boundary between spaces. Similarly, in anthropology, the term ‘liminality’ describes an ‘in-between state’ of an entity that transforms into a new entity. In International Relations, the notion of ‘in-between space’ is used in the context of borderlands and frontiers between nation-states where sovereignty is contested and the line dividing role and responsibility blurs (Meier 2019, 3-4).

In the context of ‘regional worlds’, the ‘in-between spaces’ are byproducts of region-making lying between proximate geographies that are divided into separate regions. By virtue of geographical location, ‘in-between spaces’ are often at the periphery of regions far from political and economic centres that also allow certain independence and options. Furthermore, the process of institutionalizing regions gives distinct regional identities and establishment of regional norms, values, and practices consolidate the ‘othering’ of proximate regions, this in turn creates the ‘frontiering’ of the ‘in-between space.’ In the case of ‘Southeast Asia’, the emergence of regional institutions in the form of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with its own norms and practices created an identity different from other neighbouring regions. This process produced ‘in-between spaces’ that can be described as outliers often characterized by fluidity and uncertainty. This process informed the nature of relations between the ‘in-between space’ and the emergent region with long-term implications. Myanmar finds itself as the ‘in-between space’ between two constructed regions––‘South Asia’ and ‘Southeast Asia’.

Myanmar: The ‘In-Between Space’

Prior to the emergence of ‘South Asia’ and ‘Southeast Asia’ as two distinct geographical spaces or regions, Myanmar (then Burma) was at the forefront in envisioning an Asian identity in international affairs. In the 1940s and ‘50s, Burma played a prominent role in the conception of new political ideas such as ‘anti-colonialism’ and ‘non-alignment’. Burma, along with India, spearheaded the Asian Relations Conferences to build Asian solidarity with its first meeting held in 1947 in Delhi (Singh 2010, 9). Burma was also one of the five states (along with India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia) that formed the Colombo Powers and provided leadership in convening the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1956 (Myat 2021, 387). These pioneering initiatives laid out the groundwork for the development of the Non-Aligned Movement (Myat 2025, 123).

‘South Asia’ and ‘Southeast Asia’ as specific geographical categories resulted from Cold War politics as well as the establishment of area studies programmes in American universities. In the colonial period, ‘South Asia’ was more commonly known as the ‘Indian subcontinent’, while mainland Southeast Asia as ‘French Indo-China’ and maritime Southeast Asia as ‘Malay Archipelago.’ It was only in the early 1950s that the term ‘South East Asia’ began to appear in official documents. One of the early efforts towards region-making in Asia was the Colombo Plan of the Commonwealth nation-states. During this period, there was no clear distinction between ‘South Asia’ and ‘Southeast Asia.’ Similarly, when the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a collective multinational defense platform designed by the US was formed to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia in 1954 (Guan 2022, 189), it included states from what came to be known as ‘South Asia’ and ‘Southeast Asia’ such as Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand.

While ‘South Asia’ and ‘Southeast Asia’ are exogenous terms, Acharya 2016, 349-350). As discussed above, until then, regionalism projects such as the efforts to build an “Asian regionalism” led by newly independent Asian states or the US-led SEATO had no geographical marker distinguishing where ‘South Asia’ ends and ‘Southeast Asia’ begins. Myanmar was an integral part in the Asian regionalism project and found itself in the middle of the notion of ‘South East Asia’ conceived in the case of SEATO. In Southeast Asia, regionalism took shape when Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaya formed the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961 (Wah 2008, 1). Though the grouping could not achieve much, it provided the foundation for the formation of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that came into existence in 1967 with the three founders of ASA along with Indonesia and Singapore, that got its independence from Malaysia two years earlier, as members (Narine 2008, 414). Over the decades, the membership of ASEAN has expanded and is considered one of the most successful regional blocs in the world. Unlike Southeast Asia, the idea of regionalism in South Asia began only in the 1980s. Partly inspired by the success of regional cooperation projects such as ASEAN and partly to deal with the asymmetric power relations, seven nation-states came together to form the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 (Chakma, 2020). Even though SAARC did not progress the way ASEAN did, it exists as a regional institution and has expanded its membership over the years.   

The emergence of two regional entities, South Asia and Southeast Asia, created an ‘in-between space’ with India and Bangladesh forming the eastern flank of South Asia and Thailand forming the western flank of Southeast Asia. The institutionalization in the form of ASEAN and SAARC consolidated the regionalization process. Located at the centre of South Asia and Southeast Asia, Myanmar/Burma functioned not so much as separating two regions in the traditional sense of playing the role of a buffer, but rather as an ‘in-between space’ as it found itself belonging either in SAARC or in ASEAN grouping and, therefore outside the newly formed identity of the constructed regions. One of the most significant political developments in Myanmar since the formation of the two regional institutions was the 1988 pro-democracy uprising that resulted in thousands of deaths in the violent military crackdown (Severino 2006). The response of the two regional institutions was one of indifference as neither ASEAN nor SAARC issued an official statement condemning the action of Myanmar ruling regime indicating a sense of aloofness to the developments inside Myanmar. Again, in 1990 when the Myanmar military regime ignored the first democratic elections in 30 years and refused to hand over power, both ASEAN and SAARC were found wanting in their response as neither criticized the military regime. Examining ASEAN’s position on these developments in Myanmar, a former secretary-general of ASEAN observes that “Burma’s Southeast Asian neighbours, except possibly Thailand, took little notice of all this” (Severino 2006, 132).

The silence of ASEAN and SAARC over the Myanmar political crisis is often explained through the policy of ‘non-interference’ in the internal affairs of other states. However, a closer examination indicates that the primary driver of the two blocs was regional stability (Oishi and Ghani 2016). In the formative years, a “top objective” of ASEAN was “[e]nsuring regime security in which the incumbent government was protected from internal and external threat” and “this objective was pursued at the high cost of human suffering” as “regional stability in Southeast Asia was predicated on stable states, sustained by stable governments” (Oishi and Ghani 2016, 91). In prioritizing order and stability, Myanmar’s conflict was seen as a security threat that posed a challenge to regional stability. Hence, Myanmar was perceived as a potential troublemaker that needed to be kept at a distance from regional activities. Myanmar joined ASEAN as a member in 1997 and later as an observer in SAARC in 2008, the only ASEAN member to have such a status in SAARC.

Since joining ASEAN, the international community’s focus shifted on the Southeast Asian regional bloc on its role, or lack thereof, in effecting political reforms in Myanmar. One of the reasons for giving membership to Myanmar in ASEAN was with the hope that the regional bloc could help bring internal reforms in Myanmar. To be fair, there were genuine initiatives on the part of ASEAN to bring about change in Myanmar through its ‘constructive engagement’, but such efforts have had no significant impact (Oishi and Ghani 2016). For almost three decades of membership in ASEAN, Myanmar’s unending internal conflicts have reinforced the image as an outlier and a source of polarization among ASEAN member-states. The non-traditional security threats emanating from Myanmar such as outflow of refugees, human trafficking, gun running, drug smuggling and the spillover effects of Myanmar’s conflicts further reinforced the view that Myanmar poses regional security and stability. This also strengthened the perception that Myanmar was a threat to ASEAN unity and democracy (Ryu et.al 2021). As Ryu et.al (2021) argues that the ongoing Myanmar crisis is “the most serious challenge to ASEAN” that “threatens ASEAN’s long-standing goal” in “promoting regional peace and stability” and warned that the “failure to resolve the current Myanmar crisis” could pose “a long-term existential threat to ASEAN by weakening the organization’s internal unity and decreasing its relevance and centrality in shaping regional affairs and order.”

Implications on Myanmar’s Identity and Its Internal Conflict

In the post-independence era, after a brief period of playing an active role in shaping the contours of global and regional affairs, Myanmar abruptly withdrew from world affairs. The coming to power of the military in the 1960s and its isolationist policy are often offered as reasons responsible for Myanmar’s gradual withdrawal from international engagements. Drawing from the above discussion, the ‘in-between space’ produced an image of Myanmar as an outlier not in conformity with the regional norms and posed a threat to regional stability and identity. The implications of this perception of Myanmar in relation to ASEAN can be assessed in three phases–––prior to its joining ASEAN (1967 to 1997); as a member of ASEAN (1997-2007); and post-2007 to 2021.     

Myanmar is often described as a ‘blackhole’ owing to difficulty in accessing information (Selth 2018). This is often explained through the lens of historical isolation since the 1960s when the military regime adopted an inward-looking policy. However, as discussed above, the emergence of regional institutions and the need to preserve its identity meant that ASEAN was more concerned about regional stability and Myanmar’s problems were viewed as not in alignment with the regional interests. This negatively impacted Myanmar as the regional bloc closest to it was not inclined to recognize and understand Myanmar’s problems, rather its approach was driven by the desire to confine Myanmar’s conflicts to prevent it from affecting the wider region (Severino 2006, 132). Moreover, as the regional institution became the focal point of international engagements, Myanmar’s place gradually receded into the background. The consequence was that it further isolated Myanmar and contributed to making Myanmar and its problems invisible to the outside world.     

Since joining the regional grouping, Myanmar earned the reputation of being the ‘black sheep’ of the ASEAN family (McCarthy 2006, 8-10). Myanmar’s poor human rights records and the inability to move forward in its democratization process caused internal division within ASEAN on the question of how to deal with Myanmar. This reinforced the already held view that Myanmar was a threat to ASEAN’s unity and democracy (Ryu et.al 2021). The tag of being the black sheep was an outcome of ASEAN’s concern with regard to the potential impact on its internal cohesion and international image and less about finding a solution to the Myanmar crisis. For instance, Myanmar had to forfeit its turn to be the chair of ASEAN in 2006 because of its poor human rights record. While this was interpreted as a ‘creative diplomacy’ (Severino, 2006), the fact that Myanmar was pressured to forgo its turn was a result of ASEAN’s concern over its convening power and protecting its interests. As Yadanar-Aungminim (2021, 97) argues; “ASEAN’s official interference and disregard for Myanmar’s internal affairs occurs on a case-by-case basis, depending on the extent to which ASEAN’s international credibility and reputation are undermined.”      

Since the late 2000s, major events in Myanmar drew the international community’s attention including the ‘Saffron Revolution’ in 2007 (Selth, Andrew 2008), the handling of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 (Papp 2023), the Rohingya crisis in 2016-17 (Jeong 2021), and the 2020 elections followed by the coup d’état in 2021 (Lin & Thuzar 2022) that triggered a nation-wide civil war. These events became a source of embarrassment and an irritant for ASEAN as its role in bringing about change in Myanmar met with little progress (Choong 2025). The regional bloc’s inability to effect changes in Myanmar and the international community’s increased focus on the deteriorating situation in Myanmar further pushed ASEAN to be on the defensive in safeguarding its international standing. Thus, ASEAN has been “more concerned with the establishment of a common position towards international pressure at critical moments than the implementation of a consistent approach to Myanmar’s political transition” (Yadanar-Aungminim 2021, 101). However, such an approach neither served the desire to avoid Myanmar as ASEAN’s ‘shame’ nor helped bring about positive change in Myanmar.

To view Myanmar solely in the ASEAN context through its norms, principles and practices may therefore not fully explain or help define Myanmar’s identity nor find a resolution to its internal problem as its in-betweenness imposes limitations on ASEAN. This is because the level of Myanmar’s dependency on ASEAN is influenced by the nature of its ‘in-between space’. For instance, despite turmoil in Myanmar, ASEAN thrives economically. As a frontier member-state of ASEAN, Myanmar is not a barrier to regional connectivity networks or regional supply chains. Furthermore, as an economically weak state, Myanmar does not endanger the economic prosperity of ASEAN and its member-states. This could be a factor that disincentives ASEAN to invest long-term political and economic capital in finding a solution in Myanmar. On the other hand, Myanmar enjoys a certain degree of autonomy by virtue of its strategic location as an ‘in-between space’, it is not completely dependent on ASEAN for its survival as it has options to link itself with other states and regions, limiting ASEAN’s role. The argument that Myanmar’s links with China and India weakens ASEAN’s role (Egreteau and Jagan 2008) is one such example. Myanmar’s authoritarian state has mastered in leveraging its position as an “in-between space” and playing one against the other (Egreteau and Jagan 2008). Myanmar’s authoritarian state has a tendency to fallback on the qualities of “in-between space,” what Egreteau and Jagan (2008) called the policy of “isolationism without isolation”, that the authoritarian state derives from its strategic location.

Conclusion

Myanmar was most active in global and regional affairs when its identity was not tied to a specific region. Taking advantage of its strategic location, Myanmar aligned its foreign policy with India and China in building an Asian internationalism as demonstrated in the Bandung Conference of 1955. From this perspective, to wholly rely on ASEAN or finding fault with the regional grouping’s norms and approach in addressing the Myanmar crisis may not explain the fundamental nature of Myanmar’s identity and internal challenges. It may be more useful to view and approach Myanmar through the lens of ‘in-between space.’ Regionalization in South Asia and Southeast Asia resulted in Myanmar embodying the qualities of ‘in-between space’ as the emergent regions acquired their own regional identities and norms where Myanmar was viewed unfit owing to its geographic location and internal challenges. This exploratory exposition offers a new perspective in examining the correlation between region-making and Myanmar’s internal political conflicts and its international isolation to generate debate in concretizing the preliminary observations. The prospects of Myanmar shading off the qualities of ‘in-between space’ look grim as the ideational, structural and institutional notions of the constructed regions are unlikely to change in the near future.

Like regions, ‘in-between spaces’ are also constructed. With the introduction of the concept of ‘subregions’, the notion of regions has been reimagined as new groupings emerged in the form of the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) or the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), with membership from both South Asia and Southeast Asia. However, these subregional frameworks are not an alternative to the existing regional institutions; at best they play complementary roles as land-bridges to connect the two regions. Hence, the existence of subregional institutions does not affect major changes either at the level of perception or on the ground. Geopolitical changes have the potential of re-configuring regions, and new economic integration projects transform ‘in-between spaces’ into gateways and connectivity corridors. From this perspective, ‘in-between spaces’ are full of new possibilities and in the context of new regional constructs such as the Indo-Pacific region, it will be interesting to see how such regions will shape the constructed ‘in-between spaces.’ 

References

Acharya, Amitav. 2016. “Studying the Bandung conference from a Global IR perspective.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 70, no. 4: 342–357. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1168359.

Chakma, Bhumitra 2020. South Asian Regionalism: The Limits of Cooperation. Bristol: Bristol University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1453kr3

Choong, Pui Yee 2025. “Malaysia’s Chairmanship of ASEAN: Between Continuation and Adaptation of the Myanmar Crisis.” IDSS Paper. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. No. 019/2025. https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/IP25019.pdf

Egreteau, Renaud & Jagan, Larry 2008. Back to Old Habits: Isolationism to the Self-Preservation of Burma’s Military Regime. IRASEC. Bangkok. https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/Old_Habits.pdf

Guan, Ang Cheng. 2022. “History Lessons from SEATO to the Newer Regional Security Alliances.” Rising Asia Journal 2. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore Issue 1 (January to April): 180-200. https://www.rajraf.org/10282/uploads/article/1049/6_Ang_Seato.pdf

Jeong, Yoojeong 2021. “Diverging Response to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis since 2017 Military Crackdown: Comparative Analysis of Bangladesh and Malaysia”. The Korean Journal of International Studies 19. No. 1:133-165. https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2021.04.19.1.133

Lin, Joanne & Thuzar, Moe 2022. “The Struggle for International Recognition: Myanmar after the 2021 Coup”, Perspective. ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. Issue 2022. No. 118: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/ISEAS_Perspective_2022_118.pdf

McCarthy, Stephen 2006. “The Black Sheep of the Family: How Burma Defines its Foreign Relations with ASEAN.” Regional Outlook Paper No. 7: Griffith Asia Institute. https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/server/api/core/bitstreams/aa95343e-9fdf-4ab1-8f45-4d7894bc0ed7/content

Meier, Daniel. 2019. “‘Disputed territories’ in northern Iraq: The frontiering of in-between spaces.” Mediterranean Politics 25, no. 6 (October): 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2019.1681733.

Myat, Sint Sint. 2021. “Explaining Myanmar’s Policy of Non-Alignment: An Analytic Eclecticism Approach.”Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 40. No. 3: 379–399. https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034219920. 

Myat, Sint Sint. 2025. “Myanmar and Non-Alignment Movement.” In The Rise of Asia: 60 Years After Belgrade (What Non-Alignment in a Multipolar World and for a Global Future?: Assessments and Perspective of NAM 60 Years on), edited by Darwis Khudori. Delhi. Aakar Books. ISBN: 9789350029176 123

Narine, Shaun 2002. Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia: London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. ISBN 1-58826-129-8

Narine, Shaun 2008. “Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review.” The Pacific Review 21. no. 4 (August): 411-42. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740802294689

Oishi, Mikio and Ghani, Nina 2016. “Developing a Way to Influence the Conduct of the Government in Intrastate Conflict: The Case of Myanmar.” In Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Towards a New ASEAN Way of Conflict Management, edited by M. Oishi. Singapore: Springer. Asia in Transition 3, 89-110. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-0042-3_5

Papp, Bendegúz 2023. “An Analysis of ASEAN’s Cyclone Nargis 2008 Disaster Diplomacy.” Asian International Studies Review 24: 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570008400342

Ryu, Yongwook, et.al 2021. “The Military Coup in Myanmar: Time to Prioritise ASEAN Centrality and Communal Values,” Perspective. ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute. Issue No. 27. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-27-the-military-coup-in-myanmar-time-to-prioritise-asean-centrality-and-communal-values-by-yongwook-ryu-bernard-minn-and-myat-myat-mon/

Selth, Andrew 2008. “Burma’s ‘saffron revolution’ and the limits of international influence.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 62. Issue 3: 281-297. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710802286742

Selth, Andrew 2018. “Myanmar–Watching: Problems and Perspectives.” Regional Outlook Paper No. 58: Griffith Asia Institute.

Severino, Rodolfo C. 2006. Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the former ASEAN Secretary-General, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Singh, Sinderpal, 2010. “‘From ‘Asia’ to ‘Asia-Pacific’: Indian Political Elites and Changing Conceptions of India’s Regional Spaces.” ISAS Working Paper, Institute of South Asian Studies, No. 113 (28 September). https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/113-from-ocyasiaoco-to-ocyasia-pacificoco-indian-political-elites-and-changing-conceptions-of-indiaocos-regional-spaces/

Tzortzi, J.N & Saxena, I. 2024. “Threshold Spaces: The Transitional Spaces Between Outside and Inside in Traditional Indian Dwellings.” Heritage 7, 6683–6711. https://doi.org/ 10.3390/heritage7120309.

Wah, Chin Kin. 2008. “ASEAN: The long road to “One Southeast Asia.” Asian Journal of Political Science 5. no. 1 (June): 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1080/02185379708434091

Yadanar-Aungminim, Hsu 2021. “ASEAN: Conditional Prodder to Myanmar in its Quest for Credibility?” Journal of International and Advanced Japanese Studies 13: 95-112. https://japan.tsukuba.ac.jp/research_r/pdf/JIAJS_Vol13_07_Aungmin.pdf

Further Reading on E-International Relations