OPINION – At the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, held every five years, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un left the door open for engagement with the U.S. and reaffirmed hostility with South Korea.

The seven-day congress replaced over 40% of senior officials with younger loyalists, including Mr. Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, promoted to General Affairs Director of the Central Committee. A new five-year economic plan emphasized self-reliance and national development. It included ambitious targets for grain production and industrial output, emphasizing ideological cohesion.

The congress codified North Korea’s status as a permanent nuclear-armed state, emphasizing further nuclear expansion and modernization. It also stated that North Korea’s conventional forces would be upgraded.

A new concept referred to as “Haekpangasoe” (nuclear trigger) was formalized and according to the Korean Central News Agency it is an integrated nuclear crisis response system designed to ensure that the national nuclear shield could be operated promptly and accurately at any moment, ensuring responsiveness to perceived threats. Thus, North Korea’s nuclear deterrent now includes a pre-emptive nuclear strike capability.

North Korea formally reaffirmed hostility toward South Korea, designating it the “first hostile state” and institutionalized severed ties, effectively discarding their long-standing policy of reunification. This was North Korea doubling down on their “two hostile states” doctrine.

While clearly emphasizing antagonism toward South Korea, Mr. Kim suggested openness to talks with Washington, but only if the U.S. accepts North Korea’s nuclear status and abandons its “hostile policy” toward North Korea.

There is speculation that President Donald Trump’s scheduled visit to China in April to meet with China’s President Xi Jinping would be an opportune time for Mr. Trump to again meet with Mr. Kim, this time in Beijing or Pyongyang. Their initial meeting in Singapore in 2018 was relatively successful, with a joint statement committing both countries to establish a new relationship in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity, with North Korea committing to work towards complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The 2019 summit in Hanoi failed when Mr. Trump ended the meeting abruptly when Mr. Kim would only include his plutonium reactor at Yongbyon in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. A brief symbolic meeting at the DMZ later in 2019 did not include a substantive discussion of sanctions relief for denuclearization.

Much has happened since North Korea’s 8th Party Congress in January 2021. Complete and verifiable denuclearization is now off the table. In 2022, North Korea had officially enshrined the right to use pre-emptive nuclear strikes to protect itself from an imminent or perceived to be an imminent attack. The 9th Party Congress has now memorialized the Haekpangasoe nuclear trigger doctrine, ensuring that nuclear weapons can and will be used in response to perceived threats. And South Korea, despite efforts of the Lee Jae-Myung government to improve relations with North Korea, is viewed by North Korea as their “most hostile entity”, renouncing reunification and institutionalizing the “two hostile states” doctrine, while keeping the door open to another summit with Mr. Trump, if the U.S. accepts North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and discontinues its “hostile policy” toward North Korea.

Equally important is the June 2024 comprehensive strategic partnership between North Korea and Russia and their mutual defense treaty, with North Korea providing over 12,000 troops to support Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine. In addition to troops, North Korea is also providing Russia with artillery shells and ballistic missiles and reportedly receiving missile and nuclear assistance from Russia.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula is tense, with a nuclear North Korea, aligned with Russia and China, viewing South Korea as the enemy. And given North Korea’s emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons and its doctrine dealing with the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons, efforts to deescalate tension on the Korean Peninsula are necessary.

Mr. Kim’s comment at the 9th Party Congress that North Korea could “get along” with the U.S. — and apparent willingness to again meet with Mr. Trump – could be the only viable option for defusing the potential for conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

Another meeting with Mr. Kim does not mean the U.S. has to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. It means we don’t have to put denuclearization up front in our discussions with North Korea. We do, however, must talk about sanctions relief, economic development assistance, peaceful nuclear energy and a path to normal relations when there is progress on human rights in North Korea. And in return, North Korea will have to agree to a moratorium on nuclear tests, fissile material production for nuclear weapons, and medium and long-range ballistic missile launches. Eventually, denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula will have to be discussed, but that could be after a decade or longer of negotiations.

Another summit between the leaders of the U.S. and North Korea is in the interest of peace and stability in East Asia.

Joseph R. DeTrani

The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

This piece by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joe Detrani was first published by The Washington Times

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