This article starts from a simple paradox: although age has become one of the most powerful predictors of electoral behaviour, its impact on political leadership remains ambiguous and mediated by institutional incentives, political cultures, and generational expectations. Age has become an increasingly salient variable in political science, particularly in the study of voting behaviour—a trend underscored by events such as Brexit. In several countries, age now rivals or even surpasses social class, education, and geography as a predictor of electoral preferences. In France and Italy, for example, older voters constitute the core electoral base of far-right parties such as the National Rally and the Northern League.

Across some Western democracies, generational divides have overtaken class cleavages in shaping electoral outcomes. Yet this does not imply a simple alignment between voters’ and leaders’ age. Younger voters do not invariably support younger leaders, nor do older citizens always favour their peers. In certain contexts, younger voters back older politicians who articulate policies resonating with youth values—particularly on progressive social issues. This dynamic, described as the “grandfather effect,” suggests that ideological proximity and political empathy can outweigh generational distance.

In general, young voters of 18-25 wield rather limited electoral influence in aging Western societies. Their number is smaller and their voting turnout is weaker. Older citizens are not only numerically dominant but also participate more consistently in elections. Consequently, political agendas and policy designs often cater disproportionately to the old generation’s preferences.

David Runciman has argued that when older voters form a decisive majority, long-term challenges—such as climate change or fiscal sustainability—risk being systematically deprioritized. In a provocative intervention, he proposed extending voting rights to children over the age of ten, noting that objections to this idea echo historical arguments once deployed against women’s suffrage. Decades earlier, by contrast, Friedrich Hayek offered an almost diametrically opposed vision. In Law, Legislation and Liberty, he suggested that one of the two legislative chambers he envisaged should be elected exclusively by citizens over 45—a strikingly different conception of political maturity.

Shifting the focus from voters to leaders raises a related question: does a leader’s age truly matter? Should there be age limits for holding political office? The extreme case of Paul Biya in Cameroon—92 years old, in fragile health, and president for over four decades in a country with a median age of just 20—illustrates the issue starkly. Beyond such outliers, however, it remains worth asking whether an “ideal age” for political leadership exists.

Globally, political leaders tend to be considerably older than the populations they govern. The average age of presidents and prime ministers exceeds 60, while the world’s population median age stands at 30.9. In democracies, this discrepancy reflects party systems that reward lengthy political careers as well as voter preferences for experience. Older voters—who are typically more politically engaged—often favour older leaders, whom they perceive as better positioned to safeguard their interests. In authoritarian regimes, prolonged tenure frequently results in geriatric leadership. In some cases, the choice of advanced aged leaders may even serve a strategic purpose, as dictators with shorter time horizons can be more easily managed by their entourage or replaced more regularly within elite power structures.

A common belief holds that – at least in democracies – older leaders govern more wisely, drawing on accumulated experience and restraint. Yet historical and empirical evidence offers a more nuanced picture. Research suggests that younger leaders (loosely defined as those under 60) often operate with longer time horizons and therefore feel greater responsibility for the long-term consequences of their decisions. This can make them more open to compromise and less consumed by legacy concerns. Nevertheless, youth is no guarantee of effective governance. Younger leaders may lack institutional depth, struggle to command authority in hierarchical systems, or behave opportunistically in polarized political environments. Replacing stagnation with inexperience, therefore, is not necessarily an improvement.

Applied to a typical EU member state grappling with challenges such as regional security threats (in particular Russian expansionism or US disengagement), demographic decline, or pension sustainability, these dynamics often appear relatively balanced: many EU countries have population median ages in the mid-to-late 40s, while many of their political leaders frequently fall within a similar age range (usually in their early 50s). This proximity can facilitate pragmatic policymaking: leaders are neither too detached from the concerns of the working-age population nor entirely insulated from the priorities of retirees. After all, significantly older leaders may exhibit greater risk aversion and a reduced willingness to pursue ambitious reforms that impose short-term political costs. This is particularly consequential in areas such as defence, social security, and climate transition, where delayed action can generate substantial long-term damage.

Questioning conventional wisdom, a large-scale study by Michael Horowitz, Rose McDermott and Allan C. Stam covering more than 100,000 dyads between 1875 and 2002, found that aging leaders are statistically more likely than younger ones to initiate or escalate international conflicts. From this perspective, EU countries governed by leaders from younger generational cohorts may be relatively insulated from the gerontocratic patterns observed in systems dominated by figures such as Netanyahu, Putin, Trump, or Khamenei.

Political leadership within the European Union has gradually rejuvenated. Figures such as Emmanuel Macron, Giorgia Meloni, Pedro Sánchez, and Keir Starmer exemplify a broader generational shift. The median age of EU heads of state or government has declined from around 60 in 1992 to approximately 53 today. Focussing only on age, we can conclude that EU leaders should have a longer-term perspective compared to the global average.

Probably older and younger leaders have their own advantages, depending on the context and the circumstances. However, EU democracies share a crucial institutional feature: the near-automatic replacement of party leaders following electoral defeat. While post-defeat resignations are not new, the combination of party democratization, intense media scrutiny, and leader-centered campaigning has made leadership turnover faster, more frequent, and more strongly expected than in previous decades. Parties increasingly interpret electoral loss as a cue for immediate “rebranding” through leadership change rather than sustained programmatic revision. In an extreme case, the UK had six prime ministers within the last decade. Political figures such as François Mitterrand—who lost in 1965 before winning in 1981—or Willy Brandt—defeated in 1965 before triumphing in 1969—would likely not survive today’s party cultures.

This pattern, now widespread across Western democracies, tends to neutralize whatever advantages age—young or old—might confer. It fosters short-termism, erodes institutional memory, and encourages perpetual strategic resets, often at the expense of policy continuity and long-term governance.

Ultimately, age—a partly subjective and socially constructed attribute—is neither an inherent asset nor an inherent liability in political leadership. Nevertheless, in many contexts, younger leaders may enjoy an advantage in making more adaptive or forward-looking decisions. Yet the decisive factors are institutional arrangements and political cultures that allow the strengths of different generations to complement one another. European societies that foster such frameworks are better positioned to balance experience with innovation and prudence with ambition—and, in doing so, to determine what forms of leadership best serve their collective future. Above all, time matters: leaders require sufficient time in office to mature, learn, and realize their full potential.

Further Reading on E-International Relations