On February 28, 2026, Iran suffered coordinated missile attacks from Israel and the United States. The breakdown of diplomatic negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program was followed by heavy bombing of civilian infrastructure and military sites. The assault on Teheran victimized a girl’s school (with more than 170 casualties) as well as the highest echelon of the Islamic Republic’s administration – including its Supreme Leader, 86-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was in office since the Cold War, in 1989. This event provided the apex to a 3-year long war of mutual attrition between the regional powers, ignited by unprecedented missile attacks in April 2024. The entrance of the US into the conflict in 2025, so far, has not proved decisive. In spite of President Donald Trump’s declarations that the US bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities during 2025’s 12-day war “obliterated” the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, diplomatic negotiations on the nuclear issue were still under way in the weeks leading to the February 28 attack. In hindsight, the latest Trump declarations stating that US attacks “decimated” Iranian military capacities shall be similarly taken with a pinch of salt.

Undoubtedly, this kind of unfinished business proved enormously costly to West Asia. Since 2024, neighboring countries have constantly been under fire from either Israeli or Iranian air bombing. From Türkiye to Oman, casualties are counted in thousands, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure claims a lofty price. Once the regional conflict unfolds in a globalized world, the side-effects of Israeli-Iranian confrontation flow across transcontinental networks of interdependence, bringing global turbulence and upheaval. Oil prices on the rise, the disruption of supply chains and transportation are the most visible faces of globalized collateral damage, posing a heavy burden for a fragmented world. The closure of the Iranian side of the Strait of Hormuz placed the global economy under force majeure.

The closure of Hormuz reveals a regime facing an existential threat. The selective killings of Iranian proxies in West Asia by Israel since 2024 undermined the leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah. Before the murder of ageing Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran already had lost President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter accident near Azerbaijan (May 19, 2024). The new Supreme Leader – Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei (son of the deceased leader) – was reportedly injured by Israeli bombings and did not appear in public ever since. Before the war, demonstrations filled the largest cities in Iran, demanding a way out of economic grievances enhanced by international sanctions and calling for an opening of the regime. This provided a window of opportunity for Trump threats, followed by condemnation by the European Union – plus new sanctions. Even though Trump called Iranians to “rebellion”, foreign aggression may actually reinforce the regime. Instead of a prolonged succession crisis, the killing of Khamenei brought a new martyr to the revolutionary pantheon. A billionaire campaign of air bombing cannot assure regime change alone.

Military interdependence between Western powers and West Asia regional players also proved costly. Under the fog of war, six US servicemen and a French peacekeeper (located in an Italian base) were killed in Iraq. US military bases in Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia become preferential targets of Iranian missiles – as well as NATO facilities in Cyprus and Türkiye. Lebanon was brought to the battlefield by Israeli bombings – a common occurrence since 2024 – followed by Hezbollah reprisals. Trump promised to escort tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. After Iran started mining this strategic hub, the US President backed off this promise and called upon “friendly nations” to keep the strait open. 

As the diplomatic front collapsed, the dynamics of world politics played out in cautious fashion. The United Nations’ Secretary General Antonio Guterres made reiterated calls for the end of conflict, to no avail, followed by Pope Leo XIV. Iran recently joined the BRICS+ group – however, the Global South alliance remained silent on the war. Major Iranian allies outside West Asia stood on the sidelines. Russia benefited from the sudden hike in oil prices by provisionally resuming its own embargoed exports. Vladimir Putin also offered to mediate a deal with Iran, attempting a trade-off with the West on the standoff war in Ukraine. Vulnerable to the interruption of West Asia oil supplies, China invested in the diplomatic rhetoric of territorial integrity and international law. India maintained a low profile, keeping diplomatic channels open with both sides of the war divide. Among the few vessels crossing Hormuz in March tankers heading to India were allowed to go ahead.

Caught in the crossfire, the European Union hesitated between supporting the US-Israeli war effort with their military bases, condemnation of the Iranian regime on grounds of democracy and Human Rights or repudiating the war. The political lines that divide Europe came to the forefront, evidenced by a speech from President of EU Commission Ursula Von der Leyen, in which she declared the end of “European custody” over a rules-based world order in the wake of February 28. After Iranian attacks on Cyprus, the United Kingdom reluctantly acquiesced to yield US use of military bases, although Prime Minister Keir Starmer highlighted this war was at odds with international law. Amidst domestic regional elections, French President Emmanuel Macron offered his good offices to mediate talks between Israel and Lebanon; Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez made headlines running the flag for “no war” (Spain is a NATO member and sent a frigate to protect Cyprus).

As the EU attempts to sustain a rules-based order, albeit reluctantly, the US under Trump openly challenges multilateral arrangements. This contrast between traditional allies brings more anxiety to the outcomes of the ongoing war in West Asia, as well as additional complexity to the task of framing global governance amidst the debris from this conflict.

The context of the US attack on Iran contrasts with previous American interventions in the Middle East after the end of Cold War. Differing from 1991’s Gulf War and 2011 NATO’s “humanitarian intervention” in Libya, Donald Trump’s ongoing military action dispensed with multilateral authorization and preceded the formation of multinational coalitions. The latter element also sets apart the current course of action from 2003’s occupation of Iraq. Trump’s appeal to “friendly nations” to provide military protection to the Strait of Hormuz is a sign that a coalition of the willing is missing in action in 2026 (even NATO members refrained from answering this call). In this sense, a peculiar kind of US interventionism is playing out in West Asia. In 2025, the US supported Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, joining an ongoing conflict. After unfruitful rounds of nuclear negotiations lead to another stalemate, the US and Israel launched a joint strategic bombing campaign oriented at regime change in Iran.

It is no longer the case that the United States – a military superpower – is waging war in the Middle East relying on its own devices to trigger regime change in hostile countries. Burden sharing schemes with traditional allies (channeled through military alliances or coalitions of the willing) also look out of the frame. US foreign policy seems captured by the whims of the Israeli regime – a phenomenon already explored elsewhere. However, we depart from the expectation that the US under Trump is just playing second fiddle to Benjamin Netanyahu in the Middle East. The ongoing intervention is a piece of a growing puzzle of international initiatives that marked the MAGA leader’s second administration, in tandem with other foreign policy decisions and departing from selective affinities with Israel. Conversely, we highlight that Israel attacked other countries in recent years (such as Syria and Lebanon) without overt US military support.

What single-handles Iran as a relevant part of MAGA’s foreign policy bricolage is the possibility of sending systemic shockwaves across the global economy in a way that may, eventually, benefit the US, a challenged superpower recalcitrant to assure the provision of collective goods to allies (in contrast with US’ Cold War posture and with the unipolar moment). The Iranian regime – as well as Chavismo in Venezuela, or multilateral trade regulations – poses no existential threat to the US. However, Iran provides an opportunity for the Trump administration to turn the tide of globalization by micro-managing oil prices. The same logic applies to the takeover of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela and the imposition of sweeping trade tariffs over allied countries and adversaries alike. Therefore, the corollary of foreign policy decisions is neither regime change nor “the promotion of democracy”, rather getting favorable deals from smaller powers through a combination of displays of military strength, action through normative loopholes and the mobilization of multilateral institutions. We conceptualized this conception of US foreign policy as “diffuse unilateralism”, in contrast with multilateralism’s “diffuse reciprocity”.

This foreign policy doctrine foregoes bureaucratic channels (domestic and international ones) attempting to promote the maximization of American prosperity in a thriving global economy by avoiding the pitfalls of prolonged institutional investment. In contrast with previous episodes of regime change, statebuilding and imperial occupation, Trump leads a US foreign policy on the cheap. Strategic bombing never implies boots on the ground. A combination of Special Forces and military apparel was enough to capture Maduro and pave the way for oil-focused deals with remainders of Chavismo. Institutional investment remains locked-up to a minimum level, with bodies such as the United Nations’ Security Council relegated to post-facto subscribing to Trump’s ceasefire initiatives in Gaza.

In historical perspective, “diffuse unilateralism” is not an outlier. Rather, it is the net sum of disruptions in world order brought by US-led interventionism after the end of Cold War. Across the 21st century, the US decoupled from a Liberal International Order it helped create and institutionalize. After the brief unipolar moment, American foreign policy increasingly acknowledged that a challenged superpower would play lesser roles in a ‘bigger’ world, as other centers of influence rose to prominence. Trying to roll back the rules reinforces the US’ status as a superpower with fewer strings attached, at the expense of the system’s functionality. By avoiding institutional channels, binding agreements and shunning reciprocity, the US extracts maximum short-term benefits from selective deals with smaller powers in a dysfunctional world order marked by autarchy, fragmentation, declining institutions and enhanced competition.

With the US decoupling from LIO, the European Union became its normative beacon. Nevertheless Europe is lacking capacity to overtly enforce the order and is split across antagonistic tasks (norms entrepreneurship, the maintenance of world order and regional integration). The erosion of post-Cold War arrangements was not presided over by revisionism, rather by a growing gulf between major victors and beneficiaries of 1989. Once “diffuse unilateralism” sets in, divergent normative repertoires keep the LIO in a limbo. The end of a rules-based international order was highlighted recently by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. The breakdown of the Atlantic alliance and Global South’s cautiousness rendered the international landscape more fragmented and less prone to cope with the globalized effects of the ongoing war in West Asia – which does not qualify as a “world war”. In a fragmented world of weakened institutions, global governance pays the price of collective inaction as globalized consequences are dealt with individually.

Further Reading on E-International Relations