The recent clashes underscore a simple truth: kinetic escalation along a porous frontier is a multiplier. Airstrikes, artillery duels, and intermittent border closures do not remain local nuisances. They force displacement, interrupt trade and humanitarian access, and create openings for transnational violent actors to regroup and expand. At the same time, high-level diplomatic gestures, like India’s reception of a Taliban foreign minister—help normalize engagement without demanding verifiable commitments from Kabul on terrorism, human rights, or governance. The result is a dangerous two-track dynamic: escalation on the ground and normalization in the capitals.

A brief history of the rivalry on Afghan soil

Pakistan’s footprint in Afghanistan is old and deep. From the anti-Soviet jihad to the 1990s civil war, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) cultivated proxies, trained fighters in madrassas and camps, and hosted Taliban decision-making bodies in Quetta, Peshawar, and Miramshah. By the time I led Signals Intelligence at NDS, the material flows, explosives, trainers, and fighters—were a familiar pattern. As U.S. forces drew down after 2014, Islamabad’s public posture shifted; in private and in some diplomatic forums, Pakistan presented the Taliban as a political reality to be accommodated. That accommodation was always transactional, however, and it produced deep leverage inside Afghanistan—from provincial commanders to elements inside Kabul.

India’s engagement followed a different logic but with equally transactional ends. Delhi invested heavily in infrastructure, education and development—roads, power projects, scholarships that sent Afghans to Indian universities. Those investments built goodwill and administrative capacity. But India also positioned itself as a counterweight to Pakistan. New Delhi’s network of consulates, including two on Pakistan’s border, provided both soft-power reach and strategic insight. My colleagues and I at NDS were aware that New Delhi’s intelligence service (RAW) cultivated contacts in border provinces and maintained links that could be used against Pakistan. At the time the Afghan republic rationalized these partnerships: the enemy of our enemy was a useful ally. That pragmatic logic blinded us to a harsher reality—India’s support for Afghan institutions was, ultimately, calibrated to New Delhi’s competitive needs, not an unconditional commitment to the Republic’s survival.

Two anecdotes illustrate the corrosive effect of external rivalry on Afghan sovereignty. First, while intercepting communications as head of Signals Intelligence I once heard General Dostum pleading on the phone with Pakistan’s ambassador—an exchange that revealed how quickly even vocal opponents could seek patronage. Second, a private meeting with the RAW station chief in Kabul—held months before the Republic collapsed—left me with a hollow certainty: Indian intelligence was preparing contingency plans for the Republic’s fall rather than mobilizing to prevent it. Those were not betrayals born of malice but of strategic realism: both Delhi and Islamabad were optimizing for their own survival and leverage.

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

Why this rivalry matters now

Three features make the current moment particularly risky.

First, even when attacks originate with state-adjacent actors inside Afghanistan, their effects are interstate: whether Islamabad acknowledges strikes in Kandahar or Taliban-aligned groups carry out violence, the result is cross-border harm — civilians killed, infrastructure damaged, and humanitarian access disrupted.

Second, diplomatic gestures without conditionality distort incentives. India’s public reset—receiving a Taliban foreign minister—grants political space to a movement whose internal policies remain deeply repressive. If major regional powers normalize ties without demanding verifiable changes, they risk entrenching a governance model that enables radicalization and denies basic rights, particularly for women and minorities.

Third, Afghans pay the price. External competition saps Afghan agency. Political elites are incentivized to cultivate foreign patrons rather than build domestic coalitions. Former security personnel, civil servants and vulnerable communities are either abandoned or become leverage for outside actors. The human cost—displacement, loss of livelihoods, shrinking civic space—is the clearest metric of failure.

A three-part policy approach: sovereignty, de-escalation, and conditional engagement

If Washington and its partners are serious about stability in South and Central Asia, they should adopt a compact focused on three priorities.

Prevent Afghanistan from becoming the battlefield. The U.S. should lead a regional security initiative—narrow in scope but backed by monitoring and consequence mechanisms—bringing together India, Pakistan, Iran, China, and key Central Asian states. The initiative would pledge non-use of Afghan territory for hostile proxy activity, create impartial border monitoring mechanisms, and establish rapid-response channels to defuse incidents before they spiral.

Push India and Pakistan back to bilateral dialogue. The most durable way to remove Afghan soil from the rivalry is to reduce the rivalry itself. Washington should use calibrated incentives and diplomatic leverage to get Delhi and Islamabad into issue-specific talks—starting with confidence-building measures on border management, refugee handling, counter-narcotics cooperation, and a hotline for counterterrorism incidents. These are pragmatic, tradeable commitments that build reciprocity without demanding grand concessions.

Condition engagement with Kabul on verifiable benchmarks. Engagement with the de facto authorities will continue for humanitarian and security reasons—but it must not reward predation. Bilateral ties should be tied to transparent, public benchmarks: demonstrable counter-terrorism cooperation, protections for civilian populations (especially women and minorities), and steps to prevent Afghan soil from being used by transnational violent actors. Parallel support must be scaled for civil society, independent media, and the Afghan diaspora—networks that preserve the political capital needed for a future inclusive order.

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

Realism with consequences

Some will argue that Delhi’s and Islamabad’s actions are driven by existential fears and that external pressure has limited purchase. That is true. But realism also recognizes that incentives, reputational costs, and monitoring can alter strategic calculations. The goal is not to force idealism but to make proxy strategies less profitable—politically, economically and reputationally—than cooperation.

Conclusion

The recent ceasefire and high-profile diplomatic activity are warnings more than signals of resolution. Afghanistan’s sovereignty must not be treated as negotiable currency in a broader regional rivalry. If the international community fails to act, Afghans will continue to suffer as their country becomes the chessboard for others’ strategies. The path forward is straightforward, if politically difficult: prevent kinetic escalation, push India and Pakistan toward practical dialogue, and condition engagement with Kabul on measurable protections for Afghan people. For the sake of Afghanistan—and for regional security—that is the responsible, pragmatic choice.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief