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Deadspin | NFL roundup: Panthers stymie Matthew Stafford, end Rams’ streak

Deadspin | NFL roundup: Panthers stymie Matthew Stafford, end Rams’ streak

Sports news

Nov 30, 2025; Charlotte, North Carolina, USA; Los Angeles Rams quarterback Matthew Stafford (9) is sacked by Carolina Panthers defensive end Derrick Brown (95) during the fourth quarter at Bank of America Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Scott Kinser-Imagn Images

Bryce Young threw three touchdown passes and the Carolina Panthers forced Los Angeles quarterback Matthew Stafford into three turnovers in a 31-28 victory that ended the Rams’ six-game winning streak on a rainy Sunday in Charlotte, N.C.

Stafford entered the game with two interceptions all season and then threw two in the first quarter, snapping the NFL-record streak of 28 touchdowns without an interception he set earlier in the game. He also fumbled on the brink of the red zone in the fourth quarter when Derrick Brown stripped him on a sack with 2:25 remaining.

Young completed 15 of 20 passes for 206 yards, helping the Panthers (7-6) recover from a loss Monday night at San Francisco. Running back Chuba Hubbard gained 83 yards on 17 carries and caught a 35-yard touchdown pass.

Tetairoa McMillan and Jalen Coker each caught 30-plus-yard touchdowns for Carolina, while Davante Adams caught a pair of touchdown passes for Los Angeles to bring his season tally to 14.

Jets 27, Falcons 24

Nick Folk kicked a game-winning, 56-yard field goal as time expired, giving New York a win over Atlanta in East Rutherford, N.J.

Tyrod Taylor threw for 172 yards and a touchdown and rushed for another score, as the Jets (3-9) won despite being outgained 389-269. Adonai Mitchell had 102 receiving yards and a score, and Breece Hall rushed for 68 yards and a touchdown.

For the Falcons (4-8), who have dropped six of their last seven games, Kirk Cousins threw for 234 yards and a touchdown, while Bijan Robinson totaled 142 rushing yards and a score.

Dolphins 21, Saints 17

De’Von Achane rushed for 134 yards and a touchdown, Riley Patterson kicked four field goals, and Miami won its third straight game by holding off New Orleans in Miami Gardens, Fla.

Achane scored on a 29-yard run on the first possession of the game, and the Dolphins (5-7) never relinquished the lead despite a shaky performance by Tua Tagovailoa, who completed 12 of 23 passes for 157 yards, with an interception.

Rookie Tyler Shough passed for 239 yards and two touchdowns for the Saints (2-10).

Texans 20, Colts 16

With quarterback C.J. Stroud back in the lineup, Houston won its fourth consecutive game to tighten the AFC South race with host Indianapolis.

Stroud completed 22 of 35 passes for 276 yards and one interception and Nico Collins caught five passes for 98 yards and ran for a score for the Texans (7-5). Stroud was 9-of-13 passing in the second half, including 3 of 3 on third down.

Houston’s defense held the NFL’s No. 1 scoring offense to less than 20 points for the first time this season and kept Colts running back Jonathan Taylor out of the end zone. Taylor had 85 rushing yards and 36 yards receiving for Indianapolis (8-4).

49ers 26, Browns 8

Brock Purdy passed for a touchdown and ran for another as visiting San Francisco extended its winning streak to three games by beating Cleveland.

Purdy completed 16 of 29 passes for 168 yards. Christian McCaffery added a 1-yard TD run for San Francisco (9-4). The Browns (3-9) fumbled the ball away twice, and San Francisco took advantage by scoring a touchdown following each turnover.

Shedeur Sanders made his second NFL start at quarterback for Cleveland and completed 16 of 25 passes for 149 yards and one touchdown. He tossed a 34-yard TD pass to Harold Fannin with 39 seconds left in the first half and Quinshon Judkins ran in a two-point conversion to give the hosts an 8-7 lead that didn’t last.

Buccaneers 20, Cardinals 17

Star left tackle Tristan Wirfs caught his first NFL touchdown pass and Bucky Irving had a touchdown run to help Tampa Bay snap a three-game losing streak and beat visiting Arizona.

Baker Mayfield overcame a left shoulder injury to complete 18 of 28 passes for 194 yards and one touchdown. Irving returned from a seven-game injury absence to rush for 61 yards and a score on 17 carries as the Buccaneers (7-5) maintained a slim half-game lead over the Panthers.

Jacoby Brissett completed 29 of 40 passes for 301 yards, two touchdowns and one interception for the Cardinals (3-9), who have lost four straight and nine of their past 10 games. Trey McBride extended a much more positive streak for Arizona, recording his 14th straight game with at least five receptions to break Larry Fitzgerald’s franchise mark.

Jaguars 25, Titans 3

Trevor Lawrence threw for 229 yards and two touchdowns and Jakobi Meyers had his best day since being traded from the Las Vegas Raiders on Nov. 4, getting six catches for 90 yards and a score as Jacksonville beat Tennessee in Nashville.

The win moves Jacksonville (8-4) into a tie with the Indianapolis Colts atop the AFC South heading into the first of two matchups between the teams this season.

The Jaguars outgained the Titans 272-188. Tennessee (1-11) was 2-for-12 on third downs and 1-for-4 on fourth downs.

Seahawks 26, Vikings 0

Ernest Jones IV intercepted two passes, returning one for a touchdown, and Jason Myers kicked four field goals as Seattle defeated visiting Minnesota in Sam Darnold’s first meeting against his former team.

Darnold failed to impress against the club with which he resurrected his career, going 14 of 26 for 128 yards. However, the Seahawks (9-3) forced five turnovers, Kenneth Walker III and Charbonnet combined for 108 yards rushing and Seattle posted its first shutout since Sept. 27, 2015.

Undrafted rookie Max Brosmer made his first NFL start in place of the injured J.J. McCarthy for Minnesota (4-8), throwing four picks and totaling just 126 yards on 19-of-30 passing. The Vikings recorded just 162 total yards on offense.

Bills 26, Steelers 7

Josh Allen passed for one touchdown and rushed for another as Buffalo pulled away for a win over host Pittsburgh.

James Cook added 32 carries for 144 yards for Buffalo (8-4). Allen completed 15 of 23 passes for 123 yards with 38 rushing yards. The Bills scored the final 26 points of the game, outscoring Pittsburgh 23-0 in the second half.

Aaron Rodgers returned after missing one game with a wrist injury, completing 10 of 21 passes for 117 yards for Pittsburgh (6-6). He missed one possession with a bloody nose bridge after he was sacked and stripped on the first play from scrimmage of the second half, with Christian Bedford returning the fumble 17 yards for a touchdown.

Chargers 31, Raiders 14

Kimani Vidal broke free on a go-ahead 59-yard touchdown run early in the second half and Los Angeles finished off a run-oriented victory over Las Vegas at Inglewood, Calif.

Justin Herbert completed 15 of 20 passes for 151 yards and two touchdowns with an interception while playing through a left hand injury as the Chargers (8-4) returned from their bye week with their fourth victory in the past five games. Vidal gained 126 yards on 25 carries, as the Chargers ran the ball 43 times for 192 yards overall.

Geno Smith completed 18 of 23 passes for 165 yards and two touchdowns with an interception for the Raiders. Brock Bowers had four receptions for 63 yards and two touchdowns for Las Vegas (2-10).

–Field Level Media

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Deadspin | Mariners reinstate RHP Matt Brash from injured list Oct 16, 2025; Seattle, Washington, USA; Seattle Mariners pitcher Matt Brash (47) throws in the fifth inning against the Toronto Blue Jays during game four of the ALCS round for the 2025 MLB playoffs at T-Mobile Park. Mandatory Credit: Kevin Ng-Imagn Images The Seattle Mariners reinstated right-hander Matt Brash from the injured list and optioned left-hander Robinson Ortiz to Triple-A Tacoma on Wednesday. Brash, 28, landed on the 15-day IL on May 1 with inflammation in his right lat. He is 2-0 with a 0.00 ERA in 14 relief appearances this season with Seattle, which is 12-2 when he appears in a game. Brash is 16-11 with a 3.10 ERA and eight saves in 184 games (five starts) since making his major league debut with the Mariners in 2022. He missed the 2024 season following Tommy John surgery. Ortiz, 26, was recalled from Tacoma on Monday but has yet to make his MLB debut. He is 0-1 with a 2.81 ERA in 15 relief appearances in Triple-A this season. –Field Level Media #Deadspin #Mariners #reinstate #RHP #Matt #Brash #injured #listOct 16, 2025; Seattle, Washington, USA; Seattle Mariners pitcher Matt Brash (47) throws in the fifth inning against the Toronto Blue Jays during game four of the ALCS round for the 2025 MLB playoffs at T-Mobile Park. Mandatory Credit: Kevin Ng-Imagn Images

The Seattle Mariners reinstated right-hander Matt Brash from the injured list and optioned left-hander Robinson Ortiz to Triple-A Tacoma on Wednesday.

Brash, 28, landed on the 15-day IL on May 1 with inflammation in his right lat. He is 2-0 with a 0.00 ERA in 14 relief appearances this season with Seattle, which is 12-2 when he appears in a game.


Brash is 16-11 with a 3.10 ERA and eight saves in 184 games (five starts) since making his major league debut with the Mariners in 2022. He missed the 2024 season following Tommy John surgery.

Ortiz, 26, was recalled from Tacoma on Monday but has yet to make his MLB debut. He is 0-1 with a 2.81 ERA in 15 relief appearances in Triple-A this season.

–Field Level Media

#Deadspin #Mariners #reinstate #RHP #Matt #Brash #injured #list">Deadspin | Mariners reinstate RHP Matt Brash from injured list Oct 16, 2025; Seattle, Washington, USA; Seattle Mariners pitcher Matt Brash (47) throws in the fifth inning against the Toronto Blue Jays during game four of the ALCS round for the 2025 MLB playoffs at T-Mobile Park. Mandatory Credit: Kevin Ng-Imagn Images The Seattle Mariners reinstated right-hander Matt Brash from the injured list and optioned left-hander Robinson Ortiz to Triple-A Tacoma on Wednesday. Brash, 28, landed on the 15-day IL on May 1 with inflammation in his right lat. He is 2-0 with a 0.00 ERA in 14 relief appearances this season with Seattle, which is 12-2 when he appears in a game. Brash is 16-11 with a 3.10 ERA and eight saves in 184 games (five starts) since making his major league debut with the Mariners in 2022. He missed the 2024 season following Tommy John surgery. Ortiz, 26, was recalled from Tacoma on Monday but has yet to make his MLB debut. He is 0-1 with a 2.81 ERA in 15 relief appearances in Triple-A this season. –Field Level Media #Deadspin #Mariners #reinstate #RHP #Matt #Brash #injured #list

Bunting in Major League Baseball is the ultimate tool of confirmation bias, stretching from the most anti-analytics “he’s got a great swing” truthers to those who watch baseball on a spreadsheet — all of them can love the bunt.

Traditionalists will enjoy the old-school approach of bunting as a way to advance runners into scoring position. Some who hate the pitcher-dominant game will delight in the refusal to indulge the swing-and-miss world by just not swinging. Others, who love analytics and Moneyball, will point out that bunting in 2026 could be the ultimate edge in a world that has embraced strikeout-embracing power hitting. There’s something for everyone with the bunt.

But is that something actually there? With the 2026 MLB Bunting Revolution very much taking place, we must investigate if the success of the American League-leading Tampa Bay Rays is actually due to a statistically significant increase in bunts, or if the Buntassiance is actually a Bunt Mirage. In short: I’m team Bunt Mirage.

First, some rudimentary statistics about bunting in our postmodern society: bunting has increased overall this year, though it would be incorrect to say teams are bunting more across the board. Plenty of MLB teams have actually been bunting less than in 2025, including some powerhouses like the New York Yankees, Atlanta Braves and the sport’s hottest team: the Philadelphia Phillies. All three essentially never bunt. Meanwhile, the San Diego Padres, who were the MLB’s top bunting team last year at .30 sacrifice bunts per game, have cut that down by two-thirds amid their bid to win the National League West over the Los Angeles Dodgers. It is, however, true that the Tampa Bay Rays are bunting more than any team since pitchers stopped hitting in 2021 and the most period since the 2017 Colorado Rockies.

As of this writing, the Rays are 32-15, and hold a three game lead over the bunt-avoidant Yankees in the American League East. This has led to some discussions about if high-contact teams that skimp on power might be the next thing, and it has been heralded with much rejoicing by the bunt community. But I am supremely skeptical.

First and foremost, we are talking about 17 bunts here. Tampa Bay is fourth in the MLB in hits with 416, so right off the bat (pun moderately intended) we are hit with a sample size problem: any suggestion that bunts are correlated with wins relies on a problematically low number of events relative to other data we could be using. Saying “bunting” is why the Tampa Bay Rays are winning is like saying you and your neighbor’s lawn signs specifically swung the local school committee race. Like … maybe, but there were probably more powerful forces at work.

Using data that is sufficiently large, the Rays simply do not have the underlying analytics of the best team in the American League. Offensively, they have the largest positive difference between expected and actual average, slugging, and contact quality. Their pitching has enjoyed similar aberrations, with the best of those expected versus actual metrics from opposing hitters save for slugging, in which they are second-best.

That’s a mouthful, but all any of that really means is that the Rays have been hitting far better and their opponents have been hitting far worse than the data suggests they should be. In short, they’ve been lucky with whatever cosmic, intergalactic soup controls how baseballs fly on any given day. None of those metrics are influenced significantly by their 17 sacrifice bunts, which do not actually count against the hitters on base percentage for some completely unknown reason.

As for bunting itself, I’m not breaking new ground here when I tell you that bunting is almost-always bad for your baseball team. Using fancy-schmancy, albeit a tad-outmoded run-expectancy metrics, we find that all but the most specific sacrifice bunts reduce your chances of scoring runs. When Brad Pitt said “no bunting whatsoever” in Moneyball, that’s what he was talking about.

Using slightly more in-moded win probability metrics and this wonderful thing call the Game Strategy explorer on BaseballSavant.com, we discover that there are sacrifice bunts that increase your win probability, but only hyper specific ones: if there is a runner on second with zero outs and the game is tied in the bottom of the 8th, top of the 9th, bottom of the ninth or bottom of the 10th inning, a sacrifice bunt increases your probability of winning. That is it. It is literally never good when you are winning, it is literally never good if you are losing, it is literally never good anytime before the 8th inning or with more than zero outs, heck it is literally never good when the game is tied in the top of 10th inning. And all of that still implies that the bunt is successful, which is by no means a guarantee. Are you starting to see where I’m coming from?

Most notably, the beloved “bunt with a man on first with no outs” is never a good idea under any circumstances, but I think it’s better to unpack this one intuitively rather than just tell you it’s bad. Why would a manager bunt with a man on first? Because it puts a runner in scoring position roughly 65 percent of the time (the success rate of your average sac bunt attempt). Seems good right? Sure, but that also implies there is a radically better chance of getting an RBI hit in the next at bat rather than the current one, often why you see nine-hole hitters bunt to bring up the top of the order.

And perhaps there is, under extremely specific circumstances, an opportunity to raise your chances of an RBI hit by five to eight percent by bringing up a hitter with a better batting average. But it does not raise your chances of scoring a run, just that of an RBI hit in the next at-bat. And that is not, under any circumstances, worth an entire out. Bunting with a man on first with no outs is an effort by managers to control a game that often feels like a progression of random events. But no data or intuitive explanation supports that strategy.

Much has been written about the specific situations when bunting is good (tied, man on second, no outs, late innings), but just because those situations exist does not mean bunting is broadly a good strategy. In the big picture, laying down these ultra-specific bunts is too rare an occurrence to suggest they are the reasons for wins and losses. It’s just too small a data set and too specific an ask.

I concede that the Rays are constructed basically to ignore power hitting in favor of making contact to keep runners moving, but I do not concede that has anything to do with bunting now being a good idea. The argument for bunting put forth by Rays Manager Kevin Cash that “hitting is (bad word) hard” does not mean bunting has somehow gotten easier — sac bunt success rates has improved since pitchers stopped hitting, but only marginally.

There are specific instances when bunting is good, but I do not believe those instances are common enough nor statistically significant to suggest that bunting is somehow the great edge in Major League Baseball and everyone needs to follow the Rays to bunting Valhalla. It can be surprising and even effective if it results in a bunt-hit, but the skill set required to do that is so rare and esoteric that it is never worthwhile to invest in. I’d rather my hitters just swing the bat, which is cooler, more exciting and, wonderfully, just analytically better.

#MLBs #bunting #boom #mirage">Why MLB’s bunting boom is a mirage Bunting in Major League Baseball is the ultimate tool of confirmation bias, stretching from the most anti-analytics “he’s got a great swing” truthers to those who watch baseball on a spreadsheet — all of them can love the bunt.Traditionalists will enjoy the old-school approach of bunting as a way to advance runners into scoring position. Some who hate the pitcher-dominant game will delight in the refusal to indulge the swing-and-miss world by just not swinging. Others, who love analytics and Moneyball, will point out that bunting in 2026 could be the ultimate edge in a world that has embraced strikeout-embracing power hitting. There’s something for everyone with the bunt.But is that something actually there? With the 2026 MLB Bunting Revolution very much taking place, we must investigate if the success of the American League-leading Tampa Bay Rays is actually due to a statistically significant increase in bunts, or if the Buntassiance is actually a Bunt Mirage. In short: I’m team Bunt Mirage.First, some rudimentary statistics about bunting in our postmodern society: bunting has increased overall this year, though it would be incorrect to say teams are bunting more across the board. Plenty of MLB teams have actually been bunting less than in 2025, including some powerhouses like the New York Yankees, Atlanta Braves and the sport’s hottest team: the Philadelphia Phillies. All three essentially never bunt. Meanwhile, the San Diego Padres, who were the MLB’s top bunting team last year at .30 sacrifice bunts per game, have cut that down by two-thirds amid their bid to win the National League West over the Los Angeles Dodgers. It is, however, true that the Tampa Bay Rays are bunting more than any team since pitchers stopped hitting in 2021 and the most period since the 2017 Colorado Rockies.As of this writing, the Rays are 32-15, and hold a three game lead over the bunt-avoidant Yankees in the American League East. This has led to some discussions about if high-contact teams that skimp on power might be the next thing, and it has been heralded with much rejoicing by the bunt community. But I am supremely skeptical.First and foremost, we are talking about 17 bunts here. Tampa Bay is fourth in the MLB in hits with 416, so right off the bat (pun moderately intended) we are hit with a sample size problem: any suggestion that bunts are correlated with wins relies on a problematically low number of events relative to other data we could be using. Saying “bunting” is why the Tampa Bay Rays are winning is like saying you and your neighbor’s lawn signs specifically swung the local school committee race. Like … maybe, but there were probably more powerful forces at work.Using data that is sufficiently large, the Rays simply do not have the underlying analytics of the best team in the American League. Offensively, they have the largest positive difference between expected and actual average, slugging, and contact quality. Their pitching has enjoyed similar aberrations, with the best of those expected versus actual metrics from opposing hitters save for slugging, in which they are second-best.That’s a mouthful, but all any of that really means is that the Rays have been hitting far better and their opponents have been hitting far worse than the data suggests they should be. In short, they’ve been lucky with whatever cosmic, intergalactic soup controls how baseballs fly on any given day. None of those metrics are influenced significantly by their 17 sacrifice bunts, which do not actually count against the hitters on base percentage for some completely unknown reason.As for bunting itself, I’m not breaking new ground here when I tell you that bunting is almost-always bad for your baseball team. Using fancy-schmancy, albeit a tad-outmoded run-expectancy metrics, we find that all but the most specific sacrifice bunts reduce your chances of scoring runs. When Brad Pitt said “no bunting whatsoever” in Moneyball, that’s what he was talking about.Using slightly more in-moded win probability metrics and this wonderful thing call the Game Strategy explorer on BaseballSavant.com, we discover that there are sacrifice bunts that increase your win probability, but only hyper specific ones: if there is a runner on second with zero outs and the game is tied in the bottom of the 8th, top of the 9th, bottom of the ninth or bottom of the 10th inning, a sacrifice bunt increases your probability of winning. That is it. It is literally never good when you are winning, it is literally never good if you are losing, it is literally never good anytime before the 8th inning or with more than zero outs, heck it is literally never good when the game is tied in the top of 10th inning. And all of that still implies that the bunt is successful, which is by no means a guarantee. Are you starting to see where I’m coming from?Most notably, the beloved “bunt with a man on first with no outs” is never a good idea under any circumstances, but I think it’s better to unpack this one intuitively rather than just tell you it’s bad. Why would a manager bunt with a man on first? Because it puts a runner in scoring position roughly 65 percent of the time (the success rate of your average sac bunt attempt). Seems good right? Sure, but that also implies there is a radically better chance of getting an RBI hit in the next at bat rather than the current one, often why you see nine-hole hitters bunt to bring up the top of the order.And perhaps there is, under extremely specific circumstances, an opportunity to raise your chances of an RBI hit by five to eight percent by bringing up a hitter with a better batting average. But it does not raise your chances of scoring a run, just that of an RBI hit in the next at-bat. And that is not, under any circumstances, worth an entire out. Bunting with a man on first with no outs is an effort by managers to control a game that often feels like a progression of random events. But no data or intuitive explanation supports that strategy.Much has been written about the specific situations when bunting is good (tied, man on second, no outs, late innings), but just because those situations exist does not mean bunting is broadly a good strategy. In the big picture, laying down these ultra-specific bunts is too rare an occurrence to suggest they are the reasons for wins and losses. It’s just too small a data set and too specific an ask.I concede that the Rays are constructed basically to ignore power hitting in favor of making contact to keep runners moving, but I do not concede that has anything to do with bunting now being a good idea. The argument for bunting put forth by Rays Manager Kevin Cash that “hitting is (bad word) hard” does not mean bunting has somehow gotten easier — sac bunt success rates has improved since pitchers stopped hitting, but only marginally. There are specific instances when bunting is good, but I do not believe those instances are common enough nor statistically significant to suggest that bunting is somehow the great edge in Major League Baseball and everyone needs to follow the Rays to bunting Valhalla. It can be surprising and even effective if it results in a bunt-hit, but the skill set required to do that is so rare and esoteric that it is never worthwhile to invest in. I’d rather my hitters just swing the bat, which is cooler, more exciting and, wonderfully, just analytically better. #MLBs #bunting #boom #mirage

that bunting in 2026 could be the ultimate edge in a world that has embraced strikeout-embracing power hitting. There’s something for everyone with the bunt.

But is that something actually there? With the 2026 MLB Bunting Revolution very much taking place, we must investigate if the success of the American League-leading Tampa Bay Rays is actually due to a statistically significant increase in bunts, or if the Buntassiance is actually a Bunt Mirage. In short: I’m team Bunt Mirage.

First, some rudimentary statistics about bunting in our postmodern society: bunting has increased overall this year, though it would be incorrect to say teams are bunting more across the board. Plenty of MLB teams have actually been bunting less than in 2025, including some powerhouses like the New York Yankees, Atlanta Braves and the sport’s hottest team: the Philadelphia Phillies. All three essentially never bunt. Meanwhile, the San Diego Padres, who were the MLB’s top bunting team last year at .30 sacrifice bunts per game, have cut that down by two-thirds amid their bid to win the National League West over the Los Angeles Dodgers. It is, however, true that the Tampa Bay Rays are bunting more than any team since pitchers stopped hitting in 2021 and the most period since the 2017 Colorado Rockies.

As of this writing, the Rays are 32-15, and hold a three game lead over the bunt-avoidant Yankees in the American League East. This has led to some discussions about if high-contact teams that skimp on power might be the next thing, and it has been heralded with much rejoicing by the bunt community. But I am supremely skeptical.

First and foremost, we are talking about 17 bunts here. Tampa Bay is fourth in the MLB in hits with 416, so right off the bat (pun moderately intended) we are hit with a sample size problem: any suggestion that bunts are correlated with wins relies on a problematically low number of events relative to other data we could be using. Saying “bunting” is why the Tampa Bay Rays are winning is like saying you and your neighbor’s lawn signs specifically swung the local school committee race. Like … maybe, but there were probably more powerful forces at work.

Using data that is sufficiently large, the Rays simply do not have the underlying analytics of the best team in the American League. Offensively, they have the largest positive difference between expected and actual average, slugging, and contact quality. Their pitching has enjoyed similar aberrations, with the best of those expected versus actual metrics from opposing hitters save for slugging, in which they are second-best.

That’s a mouthful, but all any of that really means is that the Rays have been hitting far better and their opponents have been hitting far worse than the data suggests they should be. In short, they’ve been lucky with whatever cosmic, intergalactic soup controls how baseballs fly on any given day. None of those metrics are influenced significantly by their 17 sacrifice bunts, which do not actually count against the hitters on base percentage for some completely unknown reason.

As for bunting itself, I’m not breaking new ground here when I tell you that bunting is almost-always bad for your baseball team. Using fancy-schmancy, albeit a tad-outmoded run-expectancy metrics, we find that all but the most specific sacrifice bunts reduce your chances of scoring runs. When Brad Pitt said “no bunting whatsoever” in Moneyball, that’s what he was talking about.

Using slightly more in-moded win probability metrics and this wonderful thing call the Game Strategy explorer on BaseballSavant.com, we discover that there are sacrifice bunts that increase your win probability, but only hyper specific ones: if there is a runner on second with zero outs and the game is tied in the bottom of the 8th, top of the 9th, bottom of the ninth or bottom of the 10th inning, a sacrifice bunt increases your probability of winning. That is it. It is literally never good when you are winning, it is literally never good if you are losing, it is literally never good anytime before the 8th inning or with more than zero outs, heck it is literally never good when the game is tied in the top of 10th inning. And all of that still implies that the bunt is successful, which is by no means a guarantee. Are you starting to see where I’m coming from?

Most notably, the beloved “bunt with a man on first with no outs” is never a good idea under any circumstances, but I think it’s better to unpack this one intuitively rather than just tell you it’s bad. Why would a manager bunt with a man on first? Because it puts a runner in scoring position roughly 65 percent of the time (the success rate of your average sac bunt attempt). Seems good right? Sure, but that also implies there is a radically better chance of getting an RBI hit in the next at bat rather than the current one, often why you see nine-hole hitters bunt to bring up the top of the order.

And perhaps there is, under extremely specific circumstances, an opportunity to raise your chances of an RBI hit by five to eight percent by bringing up a hitter with a better batting average. But it does not raise your chances of scoring a run, just that of an RBI hit in the next at-bat. And that is not, under any circumstances, worth an entire out. Bunting with a man on first with no outs is an effort by managers to control a game that often feels like a progression of random events. But no data or intuitive explanation supports that strategy.

Much has been written about the specific situations when bunting is good (tied, man on second, no outs, late innings), but just because those situations exist does not mean bunting is broadly a good strategy. In the big picture, laying down these ultra-specific bunts is too rare an occurrence to suggest they are the reasons for wins and losses. It’s just too small a data set and too specific an ask.

I concede that the Rays are constructed basically to ignore power hitting in favor of making contact to keep runners moving, but I do not concede that has anything to do with bunting now being a good idea. The argument for bunting put forth by Rays Manager Kevin Cash that “hitting is (bad word) hard” does not mean bunting has somehow gotten easier — sac bunt success rates has improved since pitchers stopped hitting, but only marginally.

There are specific instances when bunting is good, but I do not believe those instances are common enough nor statistically significant to suggest that bunting is somehow the great edge in Major League Baseball and everyone needs to follow the Rays to bunting Valhalla. It can be surprising and even effective if it results in a bunt-hit, but the skill set required to do that is so rare and esoteric that it is never worthwhile to invest in. I’d rather my hitters just swing the bat, which is cooler, more exciting and, wonderfully, just analytically better.

#MLBs #bunting #boom #mirage">Why MLB’s bunting boom is a mirage

Bunting in Major League Baseball is the ultimate tool of confirmation bias, stretching from the most anti-analytics “he’s got a great swing” truthers to those who watch baseball on a spreadsheet — all of them can love the bunt.

Traditionalists will enjoy the old-school approach of bunting as a way to advance runners into scoring position. Some who hate the pitcher-dominant game will delight in the refusal to indulge the swing-and-miss world by just not swinging. Others, who love analytics and Moneyball, will point out that bunting in 2026 could be the ultimate edge in a world that has embraced strikeout-embracing power hitting. There’s something for everyone with the bunt.

But is that something actually there? With the 2026 MLB Bunting Revolution very much taking place, we must investigate if the success of the American League-leading Tampa Bay Rays is actually due to a statistically significant increase in bunts, or if the Buntassiance is actually a Bunt Mirage. In short: I’m team Bunt Mirage.

First, some rudimentary statistics about bunting in our postmodern society: bunting has increased overall this year, though it would be incorrect to say teams are bunting more across the board. Plenty of MLB teams have actually been bunting less than in 2025, including some powerhouses like the New York Yankees, Atlanta Braves and the sport’s hottest team: the Philadelphia Phillies. All three essentially never bunt. Meanwhile, the San Diego Padres, who were the MLB’s top bunting team last year at .30 sacrifice bunts per game, have cut that down by two-thirds amid their bid to win the National League West over the Los Angeles Dodgers. It is, however, true that the Tampa Bay Rays are bunting more than any team since pitchers stopped hitting in 2021 and the most period since the 2017 Colorado Rockies.

As of this writing, the Rays are 32-15, and hold a three game lead over the bunt-avoidant Yankees in the American League East. This has led to some discussions about if high-contact teams that skimp on power might be the next thing, and it has been heralded with much rejoicing by the bunt community. But I am supremely skeptical.

First and foremost, we are talking about 17 bunts here. Tampa Bay is fourth in the MLB in hits with 416, so right off the bat (pun moderately intended) we are hit with a sample size problem: any suggestion that bunts are correlated with wins relies on a problematically low number of events relative to other data we could be using. Saying “bunting” is why the Tampa Bay Rays are winning is like saying you and your neighbor’s lawn signs specifically swung the local school committee race. Like … maybe, but there were probably more powerful forces at work.

Using data that is sufficiently large, the Rays simply do not have the underlying analytics of the best team in the American League. Offensively, they have the largest positive difference between expected and actual average, slugging, and contact quality. Their pitching has enjoyed similar aberrations, with the best of those expected versus actual metrics from opposing hitters save for slugging, in which they are second-best.

That’s a mouthful, but all any of that really means is that the Rays have been hitting far better and their opponents have been hitting far worse than the data suggests they should be. In short, they’ve been lucky with whatever cosmic, intergalactic soup controls how baseballs fly on any given day. None of those metrics are influenced significantly by their 17 sacrifice bunts, which do not actually count against the hitters on base percentage for some completely unknown reason.

As for bunting itself, I’m not breaking new ground here when I tell you that bunting is almost-always bad for your baseball team. Using fancy-schmancy, albeit a tad-outmoded run-expectancy metrics, we find that all but the most specific sacrifice bunts reduce your chances of scoring runs. When Brad Pitt said “no bunting whatsoever” in Moneyball, that’s what he was talking about.

Using slightly more in-moded win probability metrics and this wonderful thing call the Game Strategy explorer on BaseballSavant.com, we discover that there are sacrifice bunts that increase your win probability, but only hyper specific ones: if there is a runner on second with zero outs and the game is tied in the bottom of the 8th, top of the 9th, bottom of the ninth or bottom of the 10th inning, a sacrifice bunt increases your probability of winning. That is it. It is literally never good when you are winning, it is literally never good if you are losing, it is literally never good anytime before the 8th inning or with more than zero outs, heck it is literally never good when the game is tied in the top of 10th inning. And all of that still implies that the bunt is successful, which is by no means a guarantee. Are you starting to see where I’m coming from?

Most notably, the beloved “bunt with a man on first with no outs” is never a good idea under any circumstances, but I think it’s better to unpack this one intuitively rather than just tell you it’s bad. Why would a manager bunt with a man on first? Because it puts a runner in scoring position roughly 65 percent of the time (the success rate of your average sac bunt attempt). Seems good right? Sure, but that also implies there is a radically better chance of getting an RBI hit in the next at bat rather than the current one, often why you see nine-hole hitters bunt to bring up the top of the order.

And perhaps there is, under extremely specific circumstances, an opportunity to raise your chances of an RBI hit by five to eight percent by bringing up a hitter with a better batting average. But it does not raise your chances of scoring a run, just that of an RBI hit in the next at-bat. And that is not, under any circumstances, worth an entire out. Bunting with a man on first with no outs is an effort by managers to control a game that often feels like a progression of random events. But no data or intuitive explanation supports that strategy.

Much has been written about the specific situations when bunting is good (tied, man on second, no outs, late innings), but just because those situations exist does not mean bunting is broadly a good strategy. In the big picture, laying down these ultra-specific bunts is too rare an occurrence to suggest they are the reasons for wins and losses. It’s just too small a data set and too specific an ask.

I concede that the Rays are constructed basically to ignore power hitting in favor of making contact to keep runners moving, but I do not concede that has anything to do with bunting now being a good idea. The argument for bunting put forth by Rays Manager Kevin Cash that “hitting is (bad word) hard” does not mean bunting has somehow gotten easier — sac bunt success rates has improved since pitchers stopped hitting, but only marginally.

There are specific instances when bunting is good, but I do not believe those instances are common enough nor statistically significant to suggest that bunting is somehow the great edge in Major League Baseball and everyone needs to follow the Rays to bunting Valhalla. It can be surprising and even effective if it results in a bunt-hit, but the skill set required to do that is so rare and esoteric that it is never worthwhile to invest in. I’d rather my hitters just swing the bat, which is cooler, more exciting and, wonderfully, just analytically better.

#MLBs #bunting #boom #mirage

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