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Google’s Ambitious Privacy Sandbox Project Signals Its End

Google’s Ambitious Privacy Sandbox Project Signals Its End

Google just quietly killed something you may never have used or heard of: Privacy Sandbox. You should grieve this death anyway, because the implications are grim.

This basically means six years’ worth of work toward ending third-party cookies in Chrome—which might have ultimately made cookies obsolete across all major browsers—has amounted to nothing.

Reading between the lines of Google’s bureaucratic language aimed at not alienating advertisers, Privacy Sandbox seems to have been a Hail Mary effort to shift away from the invasive cookies that track us all online, with their famously murky and seemingly coerced approach to consent.

The dream was a built-in Chrome system that would have allowed the data used for ad customization to live on your device. This system would have used AI to sort you into relevant groups of users with certain traits. Had it worked, advertisers would have still been allowed to target you with ads, but without tracking you as an individual.

Needless to say, it would have also put an end to those awful pop-ups.

But according to an announcement Friday by Anthony Chavez, the Google VP in charge of the Privacy Sandbox initiative, “low levels of adoption” have led Google to “retire” a long list of Privacy Sandbox technologies. AdWeek then managed to get confirmation that this long list of dead sub-projects also spells the end of the broader initiative. Google will be “moving away from the Privacy Sandbox branding,” according to a spokesperson quoted by Adweek.

This is especially depressing for cookie haters because after years of delays, early last year, it was starting to look like Google was making major progress. Last January Google ended cookie support for about 30 million Chrome users, and the following month it rolled out a privacy-focused preview version of the Android operating system, aimed at speeding adoption of the new ad regime. With about 65% of the browser market share at the time, mass adoption of the Privacy Sandbox system in Chrome could have signaled to advertisers that the cookie era was over.

And apparently, it never took. In April of this year, it became clear that a Google-led effort to end cookies was on the ropes when Chavez wrote that Google would maintain its “current approach to offering users third-party cookie choice in Chrome,” and that it would “not be rolling out a new standalone prompt for third-party cookies.” This latest announcement is the final nail in the coffin of Google’s cookie-free internet plan.

We reached out to Google to find out if this means Google is shifting to full-throated support of third-party cookies, or switching to another alternative plan. We’ll update if we hear back.

But with Privacy Sandbox completely gone, it’s clear that somewhere along the line, the long deferred plan fizzled. Individual tracking of users is a load-bearing structure of the free, ad-supported internet, and that’s not about to change.

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The fact that this hack happened is a problem. So is the fact that it took a while for anyone to notice. And the fact that it seems no one is willing or able to do much to stop it. (And lest you think it’s just an OpenAI problem, since we recorded this episode Anthropic acknowledged its models have also hacked a bunch of other companies without either party knowing.) It might all just be a bunch of posturing and hype, but it’s also increasingly clear that the companies building large language models either can’t or won’t put the right guardrails on them. So who will?

After all that, it’s time for Brendan Carr is a Dummy, a bunch of vertical video news, and the smashing success of the Ferrari Luce. People are buying it! If one of them is you, we’d love to hear about it.

#time #panic #safetyAI,OpenAI,Podcasts,Policy,Vergecast">It’s time to panic about AI safetyWhen the phrase “OpenAI hacked Hugging Face” has more or less entered mainstream culture, you know we have an AI problem. This week, we learned more about exactly how OpenAI’s agent broke out of a sandbox and autonomously traversed the web, including a bunch of other supposedly secure web services, all in the name of cheating on a benchmark tests.The fact that this hack happened is a problem. So is the fact that it took a while for anyone to notice. And the fact that it seems no one is willing or able to do much to stop it. (And lest you think it’s just an OpenAI problem, since we recorded this episode Anthropic acknowledged its models have also hacked a bunch of other companies without either party knowing.) It might all just be a bunch of posturing and hype, but it’s also increasingly clear that the companies building large language models either can’t or won’t put the right guardrails on them. So who will?After all that, it’s time for Brendan Carr is a Dummy, a bunch of vertical video news, and the smashing success of the Ferrari Luce. People are buying it! If one of them is you, we’d love to hear about it.#time #panic #safetyAI,OpenAI,Podcasts,Policy,Vergecast

we have an AI problem. This week, we learned more about exactly how OpenAI’s agent broke out of a sandbox and autonomously traversed the web, including a bunch of other supposedly secure web services, all in the name of cheating on a benchmark tests.

The fact that this hack happened is a problem. So is the fact that it took a while for anyone to notice. And the fact that it seems no one is willing or able to do much to stop it. (And lest you think it’s just an OpenAI problem, since we recorded this episode Anthropic acknowledged its models have also hacked a bunch of other companies without either party knowing.) It might all just be a bunch of posturing and hype, but it’s also increasingly clear that the companies building large language models either can’t or won’t put the right guardrails on them. So who will?

After all that, it’s time for Brendan Carr is a Dummy, a bunch of vertical video news, and the smashing success of the Ferrari Luce. People are buying it! If one of them is you, we’d love to hear about it.

#time #panic #safetyAI,OpenAI,Podcasts,Policy,Vergecast">It’s time to panic about AI safety

When the phrase “OpenAI hacked Hugging Face” has more or less entered mainstream culture, you know we have an AI problem. This week, we learned more about exactly how OpenAI’s agent broke out of a sandbox and autonomously traversed the web, including a bunch of other supposedly secure web services, all in the name of cheating on a benchmark tests.

The fact that this hack happened is a problem. So is the fact that it took a while for anyone to notice. And the fact that it seems no one is willing or able to do much to stop it. (And lest you think it’s just an OpenAI problem, since we recorded this episode Anthropic acknowledged its models have also hacked a bunch of other companies without either party knowing.) It might all just be a bunch of posturing and hype, but it’s also increasingly clear that the companies building large language models either can’t or won’t put the right guardrails on them. So who will?

After all that, it’s time for Brendan Carr is a Dummy, a bunch of vertical video news, and the smashing success of the Ferrari Luce. People are buying it! If one of them is you, we’d love to hear about it.

#time #panic #safetyAI,OpenAI,Podcasts,Policy,Vergecast
Anthropic said Thursday that an internal investigation uncovered three incidents in which its AI model Claude breached the systems of three organizations while conducting cybersecurity tests. The investigation, and disclosure, comes more than a week after OpenAI disclosed that one of its unreleased models breached Hugging Face’s systems during internal testing.

In all three cases, a Claude model reached the internet from within a testing environment while interacting with a third party and then gained unauthorized access to the live systems of these organizations, Anthropic said in a blog post, describing what it found and what the company plans to change to prevent this from happening again.

Anthropic said the OpenAI episode earlier this month prompted the company to conduct its own cybersecurity evaluation. It specifically looked for evidence that Claude had accessed the internet from within testing environments, which are designed to act as sandboxes and keep models isolated.

Among the 141,006 evaluation runs it reviewed, the AI lab found three incidents in which its model accessed the internet while interacting with Irregular, one of its third-party partners. Anthropic said the access traced back to a misconfiguration in the evaluation environment run with Irregular. It called this a “misunderstanding” between the two companies over whether the test setup had internet access, when in fact it did.

Anthropic said it isn’t placing blame and is “approaching the fixes as if the responsibility were ours alone,” while observing that Irregular is conducting its own separate investigation.

Because of that open connection, the model gained unauthorized access to the production infrastructure of three different organizations. Anthropic said the incidents involved three different Claude models: Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and an internal research test model.

Notably, Anthropic said that in each of these cases “Claude was explicitly told by our prompt that it had no internet access.” It appears that the AI model assumed real-world systems to be part of the exercise it was asked to perform.

That assumption didn’t hold up uniformly, as it turns out. The three models didn’t behave the same way once evidence emerged that their targets were real, which Anthropic flagged as one of the more eye-opening findings Thursday.

Opus 4.7, the oldest of the three, recognized that it had reached a real production system in all four runs of that incident. In two of them, it rationalized that the real company must somehow be part of the exercise, but in all four, it kept attacking anyway, including pulling credentials and touching a database of production data. Mythos 5 also picked up on signs that it was on the real internet, but it talked itself back into believing it was still in a simulation, going on to publish a malicious software package to the public Python software registry PyPI, which was then downloaded and run by outside systems before being caught. Only the internal research test model, Anthropic’s newest, stopped on its own once it concluded the target was real.

In response, Anthropic said significant controls must be placed on these kinds of evaluations if powerful AI models are involved, echoing some sentiments within the cybersecurity community.

The company also noted that Claude was running without the additional safety monitoring and classifiers it deploys on generally available models — safeguards it said would have blocked the behavior, because the evaluations are designed to measure the underlying model’s raw capabilities.

Importantly, Anthropic said it found no evidence of any model “pursuing a goal of its own” and instead merely tried to complete the task it was asked to do.

Though comparisons between the mishaps of these fiercely competitive companies are inevitable, Anthropic in its blog post drew a clear distinction between its cybersecurity tests and those of OpenAI, noting where OpenAI’s model exploited an unknown software vulnerability to break out of its test environment, Anthropic’s models instead reached the internet through a path that had, by mistake, been left open.

Anthropic also drew a distinction between itself and OpenAI by noting that it discovered the incidents itself, through a proactive review, and that the two affected organizations it was able to reach hadn’t previously detected the activity or flagged it to Anthropic. (In contrast, Hugging Face detected the recent intrusion of its own systems first; it was only in the following days that OpenAI identified and disclosed that its own AI agent was the perpetrator.)

The company added that it’s now working with the independent evaluation group METR on a third-party review of the incidents.

OpenAI’s accidental breach of Hugging Face, which was the first verifiable case of an AI lab losing control of its model, has sparked a string of wildly differing reactions from the industry and politicians. This latest disclosure from Anthropic ensures the debate over AI models and security will continue.

When you purchase through links in our articles, we may earn a small commission. This doesn’t affect our editorial independence.

#Anthropic #models #breached #companies #security #tests #TechCrunchAnthropic,OpenAI">Anthropic says its own AI models breached three companies during security tests | TechCrunch
Anthropic said Thursday that an internal investigation uncovered three incidents in which its AI model Claude breached the systems of three organizations while conducting cybersecurity tests. The investigation, and disclosure, comes more than a week after OpenAI disclosed that one of its unreleased models breached Hugging Face’s systems during internal testing.

In all three cases, a Claude model reached the internet from within a testing environment while interacting with a third party and then gained unauthorized access to the live systems of these organizations, Anthropic said in a blog post, describing what it found and what the company plans to change to prevent this from happening again.







Anthropic said the OpenAI episode earlier this month prompted the company to conduct its own cybersecurity evaluation. It specifically looked for evidence that Claude had accessed the internet from within testing environments, which are designed to act as sandboxes and keep models isolated.

Among the 141,006 evaluation runs it reviewed, the AI lab found three incidents in which its model accessed the internet while interacting with Irregular, one of its third-party partners. Anthropic said the access traced back to a misconfiguration in the evaluation environment run with Irregular. It called this a “misunderstanding” between the two companies over whether the test setup had internet access, when in fact it did. 

Anthropic said it isn’t placing blame and is “approaching the fixes as if the responsibility were ours alone,” while observing that Irregular is conducting its own separate investigation.

Because of that open connection, the model gained unauthorized access to the production infrastructure of three different organizations. Anthropic said the incidents involved three different Claude models: Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and an internal research test model.

Notably, Anthropic said that in each of these cases “Claude was explicitly told by our prompt that it had no internet access.” It appears that the AI model assumed real-world systems to be part of the exercise it was asked to perform.


That assumption didn’t hold up uniformly, as it turns out. The three models didn’t behave the same way once evidence emerged that their targets were real, which Anthropic flagged as one of the more eye-opening findings Thursday.

Opus 4.7, the oldest of the three, recognized that it had reached a real production system in all four runs of that incident. In two of them, it rationalized that the real company must somehow be part of the exercise, but in all four, it kept attacking anyway, including pulling credentials and touching a database of production data. Mythos 5 also picked up on signs that it was on the real internet, but it talked itself back into believing it was still in a simulation, going on to publish a malicious software package to the public Python software registry PyPI, which was then downloaded and run by outside systems before being caught. Only the internal research test model, Anthropic’s newest, stopped on its own once it concluded the target was real.

In response, Anthropic said significant controls must be placed on these kinds of evaluations if powerful AI models are involved, echoing some sentiments within the cybersecurity community.







The company also noted that Claude was running without the additional safety monitoring and classifiers it deploys on generally available models — safeguards it said would have blocked the behavior, because the evaluations are designed to measure the underlying model’s raw capabilities.

Importantly, Anthropic said it found no evidence of any model “pursuing a goal of its own” and instead merely tried to complete the task it was asked to do.

Though comparisons between the mishaps of these fiercely competitive companies are inevitable, Anthropic in its blog post drew a clear distinction between its cybersecurity tests and those of OpenAI, noting where OpenAI’s model exploited an unknown software vulnerability to break out of its test environment, Anthropic’s models instead reached the internet through a path that had, by mistake, been left open.

Anthropic also drew a distinction between itself and OpenAI by noting that it discovered the incidents itself, through a proactive review, and that the two affected organizations it was able to reach hadn’t previously detected the activity or flagged it to Anthropic. (In contrast, Hugging Face detected the recent intrusion of its own systems first; it was only in the following days that OpenAI identified and disclosed that its own AI agent was the perpetrator.)

The company added that it’s now working with the independent evaluation group METR on a third-party review of the incidents.

OpenAI’s accidental breach of Hugging Face, which was the first verifiable case of an AI lab losing control of its model, has sparked a string of wildly differing reactions from the industry and politicians. This latest disclosure from Anthropic ensures the debate over AI models and security will continue.


When you purchase through links in our articles, we may earn a small commission. This doesn’t affect our editorial independence.#Anthropic #models #breached #companies #security #tests #TechCrunchAnthropic,OpenAI

Hugging Face’s systems during internal testing.

In all three cases, a Claude model reached the internet from within a testing environment while interacting with a third party and then gained unauthorized access to the live systems of these organizations, Anthropic said in a blog post, describing what it found and what the company plans to change to prevent this from happening again.

Anthropic said the OpenAI episode earlier this month prompted the company to conduct its own cybersecurity evaluation. It specifically looked for evidence that Claude had accessed the internet from within testing environments, which are designed to act as sandboxes and keep models isolated.

Among the 141,006 evaluation runs it reviewed, the AI lab found three incidents in which its model accessed the internet while interacting with Irregular, one of its third-party partners. Anthropic said the access traced back to a misconfiguration in the evaluation environment run with Irregular. It called this a “misunderstanding” between the two companies over whether the test setup had internet access, when in fact it did.

Anthropic said it isn’t placing blame and is “approaching the fixes as if the responsibility were ours alone,” while observing that Irregular is conducting its own separate investigation.

Because of that open connection, the model gained unauthorized access to the production infrastructure of three different organizations. Anthropic said the incidents involved three different Claude models: Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and an internal research test model.

Notably, Anthropic said that in each of these cases “Claude was explicitly told by our prompt that it had no internet access.” It appears that the AI model assumed real-world systems to be part of the exercise it was asked to perform.

That assumption didn’t hold up uniformly, as it turns out. The three models didn’t behave the same way once evidence emerged that their targets were real, which Anthropic flagged as one of the more eye-opening findings Thursday.

Opus 4.7, the oldest of the three, recognized that it had reached a real production system in all four runs of that incident. In two of them, it rationalized that the real company must somehow be part of the exercise, but in all four, it kept attacking anyway, including pulling credentials and touching a database of production data. Mythos 5 also picked up on signs that it was on the real internet, but it talked itself back into believing it was still in a simulation, going on to publish a malicious software package to the public Python software registry PyPI, which was then downloaded and run by outside systems before being caught. Only the internal research test model, Anthropic’s newest, stopped on its own once it concluded the target was real.

In response, Anthropic said significant controls must be placed on these kinds of evaluations if powerful AI models are involved, echoing some sentiments within the cybersecurity community.

The company also noted that Claude was running without the additional safety monitoring and classifiers it deploys on generally available models — safeguards it said would have blocked the behavior, because the evaluations are designed to measure the underlying model’s raw capabilities.

Importantly, Anthropic said it found no evidence of any model “pursuing a goal of its own” and instead merely tried to complete the task it was asked to do.

Though comparisons between the mishaps of these fiercely competitive companies are inevitable, Anthropic in its blog post drew a clear distinction between its cybersecurity tests and those of OpenAI, noting where OpenAI’s model exploited an unknown software vulnerability to break out of its test environment, Anthropic’s models instead reached the internet through a path that had, by mistake, been left open.

Anthropic also drew a distinction between itself and OpenAI by noting that it discovered the incidents itself, through a proactive review, and that the two affected organizations it was able to reach hadn’t previously detected the activity or flagged it to Anthropic. (In contrast, Hugging Face detected the recent intrusion of its own systems first; it was only in the following days that OpenAI identified and disclosed that its own AI agent was the perpetrator.)

The company added that it’s now working with the independent evaluation group METR on a third-party review of the incidents.

OpenAI’s accidental breach of Hugging Face, which was the first verifiable case of an AI lab losing control of its model, has sparked a string of wildly differing reactions from the industry and politicians. This latest disclosure from Anthropic ensures the debate over AI models and security will continue.

When you purchase through links in our articles, we may earn a small commission. This doesn’t affect our editorial independence.

#Anthropic #models #breached #companies #security #tests #TechCrunchAnthropic,OpenAI">Anthropic says its own AI models breached three companies during security tests | TechCrunch

Anthropic said Thursday that an internal investigation uncovered three incidents in which its AI model Claude breached the systems of three organizations while conducting cybersecurity tests. The investigation, and disclosure, comes more than a week after OpenAI disclosed that one of its unreleased models breached Hugging Face’s systems during internal testing.

In all three cases, a Claude model reached the internet from within a testing environment while interacting with a third party and then gained unauthorized access to the live systems of these organizations, Anthropic said in a blog post, describing what it found and what the company plans to change to prevent this from happening again.

Anthropic said the OpenAI episode earlier this month prompted the company to conduct its own cybersecurity evaluation. It specifically looked for evidence that Claude had accessed the internet from within testing environments, which are designed to act as sandboxes and keep models isolated.

Among the 141,006 evaluation runs it reviewed, the AI lab found three incidents in which its model accessed the internet while interacting with Irregular, one of its third-party partners. Anthropic said the access traced back to a misconfiguration in the evaluation environment run with Irregular. It called this a “misunderstanding” between the two companies over whether the test setup had internet access, when in fact it did.

Anthropic said it isn’t placing blame and is “approaching the fixes as if the responsibility were ours alone,” while observing that Irregular is conducting its own separate investigation.

Because of that open connection, the model gained unauthorized access to the production infrastructure of three different organizations. Anthropic said the incidents involved three different Claude models: Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and an internal research test model.

Notably, Anthropic said that in each of these cases “Claude was explicitly told by our prompt that it had no internet access.” It appears that the AI model assumed real-world systems to be part of the exercise it was asked to perform.

That assumption didn’t hold up uniformly, as it turns out. The three models didn’t behave the same way once evidence emerged that their targets were real, which Anthropic flagged as one of the more eye-opening findings Thursday.

Opus 4.7, the oldest of the three, recognized that it had reached a real production system in all four runs of that incident. In two of them, it rationalized that the real company must somehow be part of the exercise, but in all four, it kept attacking anyway, including pulling credentials and touching a database of production data. Mythos 5 also picked up on signs that it was on the real internet, but it talked itself back into believing it was still in a simulation, going on to publish a malicious software package to the public Python software registry PyPI, which was then downloaded and run by outside systems before being caught. Only the internal research test model, Anthropic’s newest, stopped on its own once it concluded the target was real.

In response, Anthropic said significant controls must be placed on these kinds of evaluations if powerful AI models are involved, echoing some sentiments within the cybersecurity community.

The company also noted that Claude was running without the additional safety monitoring and classifiers it deploys on generally available models — safeguards it said would have blocked the behavior, because the evaluations are designed to measure the underlying model’s raw capabilities.

Importantly, Anthropic said it found no evidence of any model “pursuing a goal of its own” and instead merely tried to complete the task it was asked to do.

Though comparisons between the mishaps of these fiercely competitive companies are inevitable, Anthropic in its blog post drew a clear distinction between its cybersecurity tests and those of OpenAI, noting where OpenAI’s model exploited an unknown software vulnerability to break out of its test environment, Anthropic’s models instead reached the internet through a path that had, by mistake, been left open.

Anthropic also drew a distinction between itself and OpenAI by noting that it discovered the incidents itself, through a proactive review, and that the two affected organizations it was able to reach hadn’t previously detected the activity or flagged it to Anthropic. (In contrast, Hugging Face detected the recent intrusion of its own systems first; it was only in the following days that OpenAI identified and disclosed that its own AI agent was the perpetrator.)

The company added that it’s now working with the independent evaluation group METR on a third-party review of the incidents.

OpenAI’s accidental breach of Hugging Face, which was the first verifiable case of an AI lab losing control of its model, has sparked a string of wildly differing reactions from the industry and politicians. This latest disclosure from Anthropic ensures the debate over AI models and security will continue.

When you purchase through links in our articles, we may earn a small commission. This doesn’t affect our editorial independence.

#Anthropic #models #breached #companies #security #tests #TechCrunchAnthropic,OpenAI

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