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Research Reveals the Optimal Way to Optimize

Research Reveals the Optimal Way to Optimize

The original version of this story appeared in Quanta Magazine.

In 1939, upon arriving late to his statistics course at UC Berkeley, George Dantzig—a first-year graduate student—copied two problems off the blackboard, thinking they were a homework assignment. He found the homework “harder to do than usual,” he would later recount, and apologized to the professor for taking some extra days to complete it. A few weeks later, his professor told him that he had solved two famous open problems in statistics. Dantzig’s work would provide the basis for his doctoral dissertation and, decades later, inspiration for the film Good Will Hunting.

Dantzig received his doctorate in 1946, just after World War II, and he soon became a mathematical adviser to the newly formed US Air Force. As with all modern wars, World War II’s outcome depended on the prudent allocation of limited resources. But unlike previous wars, this conflict was truly global in scale, and it was won in large part through sheer industrial might. The US could simply produce more tanks, aircraft carriers, and bombers than its enemies. Knowing this, the military was intensely interested in optimization problems—that is, how to strategically allocate limited resources in situations that could involve hundreds or thousands of variables.

The Air Force tasked Dantzig with figuring out new ways to solve optimization problems such as these. In response, he invented the simplex method, an algorithm that drew on some of the mathematical techniques he had developed while solving his blackboard problems almost a decade before.

Nearly 80 years later, the simplex method is still among the most widely used tools when a logistical or supply-chain decision needs to be made under complex constraints. It’s efficient and it works. “It has always run fast, and nobody’s seen it not be fast,” said Sophie Huiberts of the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS).

At the same time, there’s a curious property that has long cast a shadow over Dantzig’s method. In 1972, mathematicians proved that the time it takes to complete a task could rise exponentially with the number of constraints. So, no matter how fast the method may be in practice, theoretical analyses have consistently offered worst-case scenarios that imply it could take exponentially longer. For the simplex method, “our traditional tools for studying algorithms don’t work,” Huiberts said.

Eleon Bach is a coauthor of the new result.

Photograph: Courtesy of Eleon Bach

But in a new paper that will be presented in December at the Foundations of Computer Science conference, Huiberts and Eleon Bach, a doctoral student at the Technical University of Munich, appear to have overcome this issue. They’ve made the algorithm faster, and also provided theoretical reasons why the exponential runtimes that have long been feared do not materialize in practice. The work, which builds on a landmark result from 2001 by Daniel Spielman and Shang-Hua Teng, is “brilliant [and] beautiful,” according to Teng.

“It’s very impressive technical work, which masterfully combines many of the ideas developed in previous lines of research, [while adding] some genuinely nice new technical ideas,” said László Végh, a mathematician at the University of Bonn who was not involved in this effort.

Optimal Geometry

The simplex method was designed to address a class of problems like this: Suppose a furniture company makes armoires, beds, and chairs. Coincidentally, each armoire is three times as profitable as each chair, while each bed is twice as profitable. If we wanted to write this as an expression, using a, b, and c to represent the amount of furniture produced, we would say that the total profit is proportional to 3a + 2b + c.

To maximize profits, how many of each item should the company make? The answer depends on the constraints it faces. Let’s say that the company can turn out, at most, 50 items per month, so a + b + c is less than or equal to 50. Armoires are harder to make—no more than 20 can be produced—so a is less than or equal to 20. Chairs require special wood, and it’s in limited supply, so c must be less than 24.

The simplex method turns situations like this—though often involving many more variables—into a geometry problem. Imagine graphing our constraints for a, b and c in three dimensions. If a is less than or equal to 20, we can imagine a plane on a three-dimensional graph that is perpendicular to the a axis, cutting through it at a = 20. We would stipulate that our solution must lie somewhere on or below that plane. Likewise, we can create boundaries associated with the other constraints. Combined, these boundaries can divide space into a complex three-dimensional shape called a polyhedron.

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The fact that this hack happened is a problem. So is the fact that it took a while for anyone to notice. And the fact that it seems no one is willing or able to do much to stop it. (And lest you think it’s just an OpenAI problem, since we recorded this episode Anthropic acknowledged its models have also hacked a bunch of other companies without either party knowing.) It might all just be a bunch of posturing and hype, but it’s also increasingly clear that the companies building large language models either can’t or won’t put the right guardrails on them. So who will?

After all that, it’s time for Brendan Carr is a Dummy, a bunch of vertical video news, and the smashing success of the Ferrari Luce. People are buying it! If one of them is you, we’d love to hear about it.

#time #panic #safetyAI,OpenAI,Podcasts,Policy,Vergecast">It’s time to panic about AI safetyWhen the phrase “OpenAI hacked Hugging Face” has more or less entered mainstream culture, you know we have an AI problem. This week, we learned more about exactly how OpenAI’s agent broke out of a sandbox and autonomously traversed the web, including a bunch of other supposedly secure web services, all in the name of cheating on a benchmark tests.The fact that this hack happened is a problem. So is the fact that it took a while for anyone to notice. And the fact that it seems no one is willing or able to do much to stop it. (And lest you think it’s just an OpenAI problem, since we recorded this episode Anthropic acknowledged its models have also hacked a bunch of other companies without either party knowing.) It might all just be a bunch of posturing and hype, but it’s also increasingly clear that the companies building large language models either can’t or won’t put the right guardrails on them. So who will?After all that, it’s time for Brendan Carr is a Dummy, a bunch of vertical video news, and the smashing success of the Ferrari Luce. People are buying it! If one of them is you, we’d love to hear about it.#time #panic #safetyAI,OpenAI,Podcasts,Policy,Vergecast

we have an AI problem. This week, we learned more about exactly how OpenAI’s agent broke out of a sandbox and autonomously traversed the web, including a bunch of other supposedly secure web services, all in the name of cheating on a benchmark tests.

The fact that this hack happened is a problem. So is the fact that it took a while for anyone to notice. And the fact that it seems no one is willing or able to do much to stop it. (And lest you think it’s just an OpenAI problem, since we recorded this episode Anthropic acknowledged its models have also hacked a bunch of other companies without either party knowing.) It might all just be a bunch of posturing and hype, but it’s also increasingly clear that the companies building large language models either can’t or won’t put the right guardrails on them. So who will?

After all that, it’s time for Brendan Carr is a Dummy, a bunch of vertical video news, and the smashing success of the Ferrari Luce. People are buying it! If one of them is you, we’d love to hear about it.

#time #panic #safetyAI,OpenAI,Podcasts,Policy,Vergecast">It’s time to panic about AI safety

When the phrase “OpenAI hacked Hugging Face” has more or less entered mainstream culture, you know we have an AI problem. This week, we learned more about exactly how OpenAI’s agent broke out of a sandbox and autonomously traversed the web, including a bunch of other supposedly secure web services, all in the name of cheating on a benchmark tests.

The fact that this hack happened is a problem. So is the fact that it took a while for anyone to notice. And the fact that it seems no one is willing or able to do much to stop it. (And lest you think it’s just an OpenAI problem, since we recorded this episode Anthropic acknowledged its models have also hacked a bunch of other companies without either party knowing.) It might all just be a bunch of posturing and hype, but it’s also increasingly clear that the companies building large language models either can’t or won’t put the right guardrails on them. So who will?

After all that, it’s time for Brendan Carr is a Dummy, a bunch of vertical video news, and the smashing success of the Ferrari Luce. People are buying it! If one of them is you, we’d love to hear about it.

#time #panic #safetyAI,OpenAI,Podcasts,Policy,Vergecast
Anthropic said Thursday that an internal investigation uncovered three incidents in which its AI model Claude breached the systems of three organizations while conducting cybersecurity tests. The investigation, and disclosure, comes more than a week after OpenAI disclosed that one of its unreleased models breached Hugging Face’s systems during internal testing.

In all three cases, a Claude model reached the internet from within a testing environment while interacting with a third party and then gained unauthorized access to the live systems of these organizations, Anthropic said in a blog post, describing what it found and what the company plans to change to prevent this from happening again.

Anthropic said the OpenAI episode earlier this month prompted the company to conduct its own cybersecurity evaluation. It specifically looked for evidence that Claude had accessed the internet from within testing environments, which are designed to act as sandboxes and keep models isolated.

Among the 141,006 evaluation runs it reviewed, the AI lab found three incidents in which its model accessed the internet while interacting with Irregular, one of its third-party partners. Anthropic said the access traced back to a misconfiguration in the evaluation environment run with Irregular. It called this a “misunderstanding” between the two companies over whether the test setup had internet access, when in fact it did.

Anthropic said it isn’t placing blame and is “approaching the fixes as if the responsibility were ours alone,” while observing that Irregular is conducting its own separate investigation.

Because of that open connection, the model gained unauthorized access to the production infrastructure of three different organizations. Anthropic said the incidents involved three different Claude models: Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and an internal research test model.

Notably, Anthropic said that in each of these cases “Claude was explicitly told by our prompt that it had no internet access.” It appears that the AI model assumed real-world systems to be part of the exercise it was asked to perform.

That assumption didn’t hold up uniformly, as it turns out. The three models didn’t behave the same way once evidence emerged that their targets were real, which Anthropic flagged as one of the more eye-opening findings Thursday.

Opus 4.7, the oldest of the three, recognized that it had reached a real production system in all four runs of that incident. In two of them, it rationalized that the real company must somehow be part of the exercise, but in all four, it kept attacking anyway, including pulling credentials and touching a database of production data. Mythos 5 also picked up on signs that it was on the real internet, but it talked itself back into believing it was still in a simulation, going on to publish a malicious software package to the public Python software registry PyPI, which was then downloaded and run by outside systems before being caught. Only the internal research test model, Anthropic’s newest, stopped on its own once it concluded the target was real.

In response, Anthropic said significant controls must be placed on these kinds of evaluations if powerful AI models are involved, echoing some sentiments within the cybersecurity community.

The company also noted that Claude was running without the additional safety monitoring and classifiers it deploys on generally available models — safeguards it said would have blocked the behavior, because the evaluations are designed to measure the underlying model’s raw capabilities.

Importantly, Anthropic said it found no evidence of any model “pursuing a goal of its own” and instead merely tried to complete the task it was asked to do.

Though comparisons between the mishaps of these fiercely competitive companies are inevitable, Anthropic in its blog post drew a clear distinction between its cybersecurity tests and those of OpenAI, noting where OpenAI’s model exploited an unknown software vulnerability to break out of its test environment, Anthropic’s models instead reached the internet through a path that had, by mistake, been left open.

Anthropic also drew a distinction between itself and OpenAI by noting that it discovered the incidents itself, through a proactive review, and that the two affected organizations it was able to reach hadn’t previously detected the activity or flagged it to Anthropic. (In contrast, Hugging Face detected the recent intrusion of its own systems first; it was only in the following days that OpenAI identified and disclosed that its own AI agent was the perpetrator.)

The company added that it’s now working with the independent evaluation group METR on a third-party review of the incidents.

OpenAI’s accidental breach of Hugging Face, which was the first verifiable case of an AI lab losing control of its model, has sparked a string of wildly differing reactions from the industry and politicians. This latest disclosure from Anthropic ensures the debate over AI models and security will continue.

When you purchase through links in our articles, we may earn a small commission. This doesn’t affect our editorial independence.

#Anthropic #models #breached #companies #security #tests #TechCrunchAnthropic,OpenAI">Anthropic says its own AI models breached three companies during security tests | TechCrunch
Anthropic said Thursday that an internal investigation uncovered three incidents in which its AI model Claude breached the systems of three organizations while conducting cybersecurity tests. The investigation, and disclosure, comes more than a week after OpenAI disclosed that one of its unreleased models breached Hugging Face’s systems during internal testing.

In all three cases, a Claude model reached the internet from within a testing environment while interacting with a third party and then gained unauthorized access to the live systems of these organizations, Anthropic said in a blog post, describing what it found and what the company plans to change to prevent this from happening again.







Anthropic said the OpenAI episode earlier this month prompted the company to conduct its own cybersecurity evaluation. It specifically looked for evidence that Claude had accessed the internet from within testing environments, which are designed to act as sandboxes and keep models isolated.

Among the 141,006 evaluation runs it reviewed, the AI lab found three incidents in which its model accessed the internet while interacting with Irregular, one of its third-party partners. Anthropic said the access traced back to a misconfiguration in the evaluation environment run with Irregular. It called this a “misunderstanding” between the two companies over whether the test setup had internet access, when in fact it did. 

Anthropic said it isn’t placing blame and is “approaching the fixes as if the responsibility were ours alone,” while observing that Irregular is conducting its own separate investigation.

Because of that open connection, the model gained unauthorized access to the production infrastructure of three different organizations. Anthropic said the incidents involved three different Claude models: Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and an internal research test model.

Notably, Anthropic said that in each of these cases “Claude was explicitly told by our prompt that it had no internet access.” It appears that the AI model assumed real-world systems to be part of the exercise it was asked to perform.


That assumption didn’t hold up uniformly, as it turns out. The three models didn’t behave the same way once evidence emerged that their targets were real, which Anthropic flagged as one of the more eye-opening findings Thursday.

Opus 4.7, the oldest of the three, recognized that it had reached a real production system in all four runs of that incident. In two of them, it rationalized that the real company must somehow be part of the exercise, but in all four, it kept attacking anyway, including pulling credentials and touching a database of production data. Mythos 5 also picked up on signs that it was on the real internet, but it talked itself back into believing it was still in a simulation, going on to publish a malicious software package to the public Python software registry PyPI, which was then downloaded and run by outside systems before being caught. Only the internal research test model, Anthropic’s newest, stopped on its own once it concluded the target was real.

In response, Anthropic said significant controls must be placed on these kinds of evaluations if powerful AI models are involved, echoing some sentiments within the cybersecurity community.







The company also noted that Claude was running without the additional safety monitoring and classifiers it deploys on generally available models — safeguards it said would have blocked the behavior, because the evaluations are designed to measure the underlying model’s raw capabilities.

Importantly, Anthropic said it found no evidence of any model “pursuing a goal of its own” and instead merely tried to complete the task it was asked to do.

Though comparisons between the mishaps of these fiercely competitive companies are inevitable, Anthropic in its blog post drew a clear distinction between its cybersecurity tests and those of OpenAI, noting where OpenAI’s model exploited an unknown software vulnerability to break out of its test environment, Anthropic’s models instead reached the internet through a path that had, by mistake, been left open.

Anthropic also drew a distinction between itself and OpenAI by noting that it discovered the incidents itself, through a proactive review, and that the two affected organizations it was able to reach hadn’t previously detected the activity or flagged it to Anthropic. (In contrast, Hugging Face detected the recent intrusion of its own systems first; it was only in the following days that OpenAI identified and disclosed that its own AI agent was the perpetrator.)

The company added that it’s now working with the independent evaluation group METR on a third-party review of the incidents.

OpenAI’s accidental breach of Hugging Face, which was the first verifiable case of an AI lab losing control of its model, has sparked a string of wildly differing reactions from the industry and politicians. This latest disclosure from Anthropic ensures the debate over AI models and security will continue.


When you purchase through links in our articles, we may earn a small commission. This doesn’t affect our editorial independence.#Anthropic #models #breached #companies #security #tests #TechCrunchAnthropic,OpenAI

Hugging Face’s systems during internal testing.

In all three cases, a Claude model reached the internet from within a testing environment while interacting with a third party and then gained unauthorized access to the live systems of these organizations, Anthropic said in a blog post, describing what it found and what the company plans to change to prevent this from happening again.

Anthropic said the OpenAI episode earlier this month prompted the company to conduct its own cybersecurity evaluation. It specifically looked for evidence that Claude had accessed the internet from within testing environments, which are designed to act as sandboxes and keep models isolated.

Among the 141,006 evaluation runs it reviewed, the AI lab found three incidents in which its model accessed the internet while interacting with Irregular, one of its third-party partners. Anthropic said the access traced back to a misconfiguration in the evaluation environment run with Irregular. It called this a “misunderstanding” between the two companies over whether the test setup had internet access, when in fact it did.

Anthropic said it isn’t placing blame and is “approaching the fixes as if the responsibility were ours alone,” while observing that Irregular is conducting its own separate investigation.

Because of that open connection, the model gained unauthorized access to the production infrastructure of three different organizations. Anthropic said the incidents involved three different Claude models: Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and an internal research test model.

Notably, Anthropic said that in each of these cases “Claude was explicitly told by our prompt that it had no internet access.” It appears that the AI model assumed real-world systems to be part of the exercise it was asked to perform.

That assumption didn’t hold up uniformly, as it turns out. The three models didn’t behave the same way once evidence emerged that their targets were real, which Anthropic flagged as one of the more eye-opening findings Thursday.

Opus 4.7, the oldest of the three, recognized that it had reached a real production system in all four runs of that incident. In two of them, it rationalized that the real company must somehow be part of the exercise, but in all four, it kept attacking anyway, including pulling credentials and touching a database of production data. Mythos 5 also picked up on signs that it was on the real internet, but it talked itself back into believing it was still in a simulation, going on to publish a malicious software package to the public Python software registry PyPI, which was then downloaded and run by outside systems before being caught. Only the internal research test model, Anthropic’s newest, stopped on its own once it concluded the target was real.

In response, Anthropic said significant controls must be placed on these kinds of evaluations if powerful AI models are involved, echoing some sentiments within the cybersecurity community.

The company also noted that Claude was running without the additional safety monitoring and classifiers it deploys on generally available models — safeguards it said would have blocked the behavior, because the evaluations are designed to measure the underlying model’s raw capabilities.

Importantly, Anthropic said it found no evidence of any model “pursuing a goal of its own” and instead merely tried to complete the task it was asked to do.

Though comparisons between the mishaps of these fiercely competitive companies are inevitable, Anthropic in its blog post drew a clear distinction between its cybersecurity tests and those of OpenAI, noting where OpenAI’s model exploited an unknown software vulnerability to break out of its test environment, Anthropic’s models instead reached the internet through a path that had, by mistake, been left open.

Anthropic also drew a distinction between itself and OpenAI by noting that it discovered the incidents itself, through a proactive review, and that the two affected organizations it was able to reach hadn’t previously detected the activity or flagged it to Anthropic. (In contrast, Hugging Face detected the recent intrusion of its own systems first; it was only in the following days that OpenAI identified and disclosed that its own AI agent was the perpetrator.)

The company added that it’s now working with the independent evaluation group METR on a third-party review of the incidents.

OpenAI’s accidental breach of Hugging Face, which was the first verifiable case of an AI lab losing control of its model, has sparked a string of wildly differing reactions from the industry and politicians. This latest disclosure from Anthropic ensures the debate over AI models and security will continue.

When you purchase through links in our articles, we may earn a small commission. This doesn’t affect our editorial independence.

#Anthropic #models #breached #companies #security #tests #TechCrunchAnthropic,OpenAI">Anthropic says its own AI models breached three companies during security tests | TechCrunch

Anthropic said Thursday that an internal investigation uncovered three incidents in which its AI model Claude breached the systems of three organizations while conducting cybersecurity tests. The investigation, and disclosure, comes more than a week after OpenAI disclosed that one of its unreleased models breached Hugging Face’s systems during internal testing.

In all three cases, a Claude model reached the internet from within a testing environment while interacting with a third party and then gained unauthorized access to the live systems of these organizations, Anthropic said in a blog post, describing what it found and what the company plans to change to prevent this from happening again.

Anthropic said the OpenAI episode earlier this month prompted the company to conduct its own cybersecurity evaluation. It specifically looked for evidence that Claude had accessed the internet from within testing environments, which are designed to act as sandboxes and keep models isolated.

Among the 141,006 evaluation runs it reviewed, the AI lab found three incidents in which its model accessed the internet while interacting with Irregular, one of its third-party partners. Anthropic said the access traced back to a misconfiguration in the evaluation environment run with Irregular. It called this a “misunderstanding” between the two companies over whether the test setup had internet access, when in fact it did.

Anthropic said it isn’t placing blame and is “approaching the fixes as if the responsibility were ours alone,” while observing that Irregular is conducting its own separate investigation.

Because of that open connection, the model gained unauthorized access to the production infrastructure of three different organizations. Anthropic said the incidents involved three different Claude models: Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and an internal research test model.

Notably, Anthropic said that in each of these cases “Claude was explicitly told by our prompt that it had no internet access.” It appears that the AI model assumed real-world systems to be part of the exercise it was asked to perform.

That assumption didn’t hold up uniformly, as it turns out. The three models didn’t behave the same way once evidence emerged that their targets were real, which Anthropic flagged as one of the more eye-opening findings Thursday.

Opus 4.7, the oldest of the three, recognized that it had reached a real production system in all four runs of that incident. In two of them, it rationalized that the real company must somehow be part of the exercise, but in all four, it kept attacking anyway, including pulling credentials and touching a database of production data. Mythos 5 also picked up on signs that it was on the real internet, but it talked itself back into believing it was still in a simulation, going on to publish a malicious software package to the public Python software registry PyPI, which was then downloaded and run by outside systems before being caught. Only the internal research test model, Anthropic’s newest, stopped on its own once it concluded the target was real.

In response, Anthropic said significant controls must be placed on these kinds of evaluations if powerful AI models are involved, echoing some sentiments within the cybersecurity community.

The company also noted that Claude was running without the additional safety monitoring and classifiers it deploys on generally available models — safeguards it said would have blocked the behavior, because the evaluations are designed to measure the underlying model’s raw capabilities.

Importantly, Anthropic said it found no evidence of any model “pursuing a goal of its own” and instead merely tried to complete the task it was asked to do.

Though comparisons between the mishaps of these fiercely competitive companies are inevitable, Anthropic in its blog post drew a clear distinction between its cybersecurity tests and those of OpenAI, noting where OpenAI’s model exploited an unknown software vulnerability to break out of its test environment, Anthropic’s models instead reached the internet through a path that had, by mistake, been left open.

Anthropic also drew a distinction between itself and OpenAI by noting that it discovered the incidents itself, through a proactive review, and that the two affected organizations it was able to reach hadn’t previously detected the activity or flagged it to Anthropic. (In contrast, Hugging Face detected the recent intrusion of its own systems first; it was only in the following days that OpenAI identified and disclosed that its own AI agent was the perpetrator.)

The company added that it’s now working with the independent evaluation group METR on a third-party review of the incidents.

OpenAI’s accidental breach of Hugging Face, which was the first verifiable case of an AI lab losing control of its model, has sparked a string of wildly differing reactions from the industry and politicians. This latest disclosure from Anthropic ensures the debate over AI models and security will continue.

When you purchase through links in our articles, we may earn a small commission. This doesn’t affect our editorial independence.

#Anthropic #models #breached #companies #security #tests #TechCrunchAnthropic,OpenAI

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