Resilience is an important concept that has dominated European security discussions over the last decade, notably since 2014 when Russia orchestrated the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula; an action that the international community including the UN condemned as illegal (Biersack & O’lear, 2014; Buliga, 2022, 6-7). The concept of resilience according to Bourke, and Schott (2022) appears to be closely linked to the emergence of dangers within the military, political, economic, informational, and cyber spheres. The hybrid nature of resilience is attributed to potential overuse in policy speeches, strategy reports, and donor programs. This application has pushed the concept of resilience beyond military might to imply the capacity of states to endure shocks and disruption. To smaller states, like Moldova, which must deal with more vulnerability to existing geopolitical shocks and hybrid pressures, resilience is not just a fashionable buzzword. Instead, it is the foundation for societal cohesion, democratic continuity, and national stability. For Moldova, restoring clarity to what resilience truly entails is crucial for achieving preparedness to absorb crises and continuity of governance using NATO’s valuable input. 

Originally, resilience denoted the work involved in straining the elastic body to its limit and the resulting effort to recover from such strain (Fluri and Tagarev, 2020). Its use in psychology represents the quality allowing individuals to be “knocked down by the adversities of life and come back at least as strong as before (Anju, 2022).” Its pure interpretation within academic and engineering perspectives is integral to the discursive role resilience plays in today’s context of security. Such is evident in the ‘Resilient Bulgaria’ 2020 strategy, where resilience is interpreted as the capability to ‘anticipate, tolerate, overcome, and adjust to adverse experiences, attacks, and compromises on systems using and enabled by the cyber resources’ (Ross et al. 2019).  Applying the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015, the United Nations (UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2005) considers resilience as:

The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards, to adapt by resisting or changing to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure.

Applying the follow-up Sendai Framework for Action, the UN extended resilience to mean delivering a “renewed sense of urgency”, which necessitates disaster risk reduction and integrating resilience into national policies, plans, programs, and budgets (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015). Its application to the EU considers resilience as the capability of the states and societies to sustain reforms by withstanding and recovering from internally and externally occurring crises (European Union, 2016). Extrapolating this awareness portrays a resilient state as secure, and whose society features democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development (European Union, 2016).

For Moldova, resilience is presented through support for inclusive governance, fighting terrorism, organised crime, and ensuring the rule of law. The realisation of state resilience involves pegging support to various paths by directing support to the severe cases vulnerable to governmental, economic, energy, and societal fragility (European Union, 2016, 9). This understanding is portrayed in the EU neighbourhood policy that societal resilience is unattainable for any state unless it addresses humanitarian issues, investment, health, education, infrastructure, development, and trade (European Union, 2016, 26). Resilience, as understood from the above perspectives, refers to the resistance, absorption, and recovery from disruptive events and hybrid threats while sustaining core functions. This extends to establishing a whole-of-society approach through active cooperation across the government, civil society, and private sector (NATO, 2016). This informs resilience in the NATO context as the preparedness to resist, respond, and readily recover when faced with shocks and disruptions. 

Moldova is a landlocked Eastern European country between Ukraine and Romania. Despite its independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, its location has been the most volatile and unstable security region in Europe. The fact that it borders the current Russian-Ukrainian war exposes Moldova to spill-over effects such as the refugee management crisis, cyber threats, and energy insecurity (Secrieru, 2024). Moldova has borne the burden of hosting over 100,000 refugees (Bradbury and Nolan, 2022). The influx imposed a substantial burden on its limited nation’s resources. The refugee crisis leaves Moldova reliant on international aid from the EU to meet the basic needs of this population.  The invasion of Ukraine by Russia rewrote the script on regional population movements and displacements. In particular, the external shock transformed Moldova into a two-way corridor to leave and land for people shaped by the violent conflict (Ciobanu, 2024). This amplifies the existing weaknesses and creates narrow opportunities. The capability of Moldova to navigate this moment relies upon producing reliance to overcome deeper fragility by shifting from the short-term emergency responses to guaranteed long-term integration. 

The unresolved case of Transnistria in Moldova further complicates the situation, which became unstable, especially after the region proclaimed independence in 1992. Despite the lack of international acknowledgment, Transnistria is an unstable status quo that affects the journey of Moldova into the EU. Instability is increased by the Russian presence, diplomatic stalemate, and economic connections with Moscow (Hellmann, 2023, 79). The ability of Moldova to withstand such a geopolitical landscape depends on the development of strong institutions that can withstand unexpected strain without collapsing and experiencing paralysis (Hellmann, 2023, 81). The empowerment of Moldova is also a priority to protect state sovereignty. Thus, it goes beyond simply maintaining the country’s integrity on paper but exercising effective control while delivering public goods across its entire internationally recognised territory including the regions which are autonomous such as Gagauzia and in its relations with the Transnistrian region which is a breakaway. When citizens in all areas have the perception that the government in Chișinău is legitimate and capable of providing security, essential services, and economic opportunity, sovereignty is strengthened. Subsequently, for Chișinău, it means investing in infrastructure which physically connects the nation to EU and Romania, reducing the gravitation pull of external factors. Moreover, it involves proactive information campaigns and public diplomacy for purposes of countering disinformation as well as building a unifying national civic identity which transcends linguistic and ethnic lines. 

Energy insecurity is a major issue in Moldova, which has appeared due to decades of dependence on Gazprom as a sole external source. The single-sourcing created structural vulnerabilities revealed during the 2021-22 energy crisis when Russia weaponised energy against Moldova (Douglas, 2025, 13). The move to reduce exports to Moldova triggered economic strain and political uncertainty. This prompted diversification via interconnections with Romania and participation in the EU energy market. Attaining long-term resilience for Moldova mandates modernising the infrastructure and building strategic reserves for energy supplies. Realising robust energy resilience directly influences national stability and winning the citizens’ trust in state institutions.

Cybersecurity is also a primary concern for Moldova, given the Kremlin’s efforts to influence the parliamentary election, the 2024 referendum, and the presidential election. Although there has been a tremendous initiative on the part of the former Soviet republic to become a member of the EU, the Kremlin nonetheless continues to work towards its goal of restoring its influence in Chisinau. Although efforts have been made to set up the national CERT facilities and to improve the process of interagency coordination, Moldova is challenged by the absence of resources and perpetual deficits in capacity. Cyber resilience can be achieved by creating technical defences, trained staff, a trusted incident reporting system, and raising awareness among the population. This is one of the areas where Moldova can utilise the immense NATO expertise. 

Moldova is faced with institutional vulnerability due to weak administrative capacity, corruption, and politicisation. The rule of law, enhanced professionalism within the state, and transparent governance are the key building blocks of a strong Moldova. These objectives are backed by the reform agenda associated with the EU candidacy. However, it needs to maintain the political will and credible external support for the institutions and civil society preparedness to solve the Ukrainian influx of refugees (Ciobanu, 2024). Its implementation requires the promotion of social cohesion, community solidarity, and greater community preparedness to collectively deal with crises. 

Establishing the required deterrence, countermeasure, and recovery from disruptions and threats occurring within the civilian sector mandates resilience attainable via effective action, plans, and response measures that are protectively defined and exercised regularly. The pursuit of resilience, per the NATO perspective, imposes a national responsibility and individual allies’ efforts to strengthen the alliance (Szenes, 2023). This extends the mandate of allies to enhance resilience by developing national defence capacity, assuring uninterrupted access to the critical infrastructure, and establishing reliable backup plans during a crisis. NATO integrates the resilience concept into its security doctrine outlined in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This obliges the members to sustain and develop individual and collective capability to resist armed attack. While Moldova is not a NATO member, the alliance’s external action details a useful benchmark that partner countries could tap to optimise preparedness. 

NATO pursues resilience via a set of baseline requirements outlined in Article 73 of the Communiqué, as principal benchmarks during crises. The alliance identifies continuity of government, having reliable energy supplies, robust transport, and functioning communications alongside the capacity to manage mass movements of people (NATO, 2016). NATO also outlines the necessity of having a resilient healthcare system flagged by emergency services and a mechanism for civil-military coordination as a priority to achieve resilience. These baseline requirements are applicable to Moldova, with each pillar pertinent to the limited resources, vulnerability to regional instability, and ongoing governance reforms. In addition to the readiness to engage in military aggression, national resilience is also applicable to the ability to respond to hybrid threats, such as cyberattacks, political interference, weaponization of energy, and disinformation. Moldova is susceptible to all these challenges, and the ability to endure them is a feasible consideration. In many cases, the hybrid threats are aimed at capitalising on the already prevailing societal divisions, infrastructural vulnerabilities, and weak institutions (Olech, 2025). This proves that resilience is not only concerned with the installation of tangible resources but also with the formation of cohesive communities, trusted institutions, and the nurturing of democratic legitimacy. The neutrality of Moldova will not be enough to offer the same security that the country is pursuing against economic pressure, disinformation, and cyber activities (Hellmann, 2023, 23). Consequently, the establishment of stronger civilian institutions alongside the national preparedness is a strategic requirement that Moldova needs to be more stable without jeopardising its Constitutional commitment to neutrality. 

Decades of experience in emergency planning by NATO present an invaluable partnership that Moldovans can use to realise civil preparedness. Specifically, by establishing a broad national crisis-response framework, NATO will be able to address the existing inefficiencies surrounding the strained resources in Moldova to achieve interagency coordination. The NATO emphasis on cross-sectoral resilience would match the short-term preparedness and the long-term strategies with the Moldova National Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy (NATO, 2025). This can be achieved through conducting joint simulations and putting up early warning systems. These steps will ensure continuity of governance, which is among the resilience baselines of NATO in crises (NATO, 2016). 

Advancing cyber defence cooperation can be used to solve the cybersecurity vulnerability of Moldova with NATO. This would entail integrating the training of cybersecurity staff in the newly formed National Agency for Cyber Security with the e-Governance Academy (eGA, 2023). The NATO knowledge would assist in orienting the Moldovan cyber professionals towards becoming better responders to incidents through simulated attacks. NATO experience will help establish the national cyber incident response team and the Moldova contact point to bring more awareness and education to the citizens in the cybersecurity domain. Also, Moldova has an opportunity to collaborate with the NATO Centres of Excellence, including the CCDCOE in Tallinn (Gold, 2019). This would allow the cybersecurity staff of Moldova to foster threat intelligence, conduct red-team testing, and implement communication practices to increase the cyber resilience of the country.

Moldova’s capacity to overcome disinformation and manipulation rests upon nurturing strategic communication. The achievement of this objective would require NATO to offer StratCom expertise to overcome the sustained disinformation pressure imposed by foreign adversaries. NATO can extend this support towards crafting evidence-backed communication and training personnel in crisis communication. The involvement of NATO’s StratCom Centre of Excellence (COE) to operationalise the EU-Moldova Security and Defence Partnership will harmonise efforts to counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), cyber, and hybrid threats (European Union Institute for Security Studies. 2025). This process would involve prioritising public resilience to spot and overcome manipulative narratives. This is possible by NATO facilitating Moldova to nurture proactive and transparent communication in governance structures to strengthen trust and limit the impact of destabilising information operations.

NATO could prioritise capacity building in the Moldovan security sector using non-lethal assistance. While Moldova remains militarily neutral, the alliance could offer non-lethal assistance, including professionalisation, institutional reforms, governance support, and logistics planning. Presenting these tools would help strengthen Moldova’s internal capacity to counter corruption vulnerabilities and ensure alignment of administrative practices and priorities with the international standards (NATO, 2024a). Granting this support aligns with Moldova’s constitutional commitments and reinforces its resilience.

NATO could offer energy resilience support to Moldova, ending its decades of reliance on Gazprom, whose weaponization caused enormous destruction. NATO has, in the past, integrated energy security into its strategic agenda. Doing so acknowledges the centrality of energy security to resilience (NATO, 2024b). A notable benefit is that Moldova is tapping the technical expertise of NATO in risk analysis, infrastructure protection, and stronger cyber protections to shield the energy networks. Strengthening the physical and cyber protections of energy networks could shield this strategic sector from disruptions that foreign adversaries continually exploit. Integrating Moldova into NATO’s undersea cables agenda would enable the Eastern European country to overcome potential sabotage witnessed from relying on Gazprom for supplies. NATO acknowledges that the extraction and transport of two-thirds of the global oil and gas is made possible by sea. Similarly, the transmission of nearly 95% of the global data occurs via undersea cables (Clare et al., 2023). This awareness mandates NATO to protect the critical undersea infrastructure. Extending this security and defence priority to Moldova will enable the country to secure and protect its prosperity as an allied society. In particular, Moldova could utilise the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell created by NATO to avoid the recurrence of sabotage to the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022 (NATO, 2023). The inclusion will help Moldova benefit from the proactive mapping of vulnerabilities and coordinated efforts among NATO allies, the private sector, and partners.

NATO offers Moldova the gateway to regional cooperation needed to support border security and manage cross-border emergencies. For instance, NATO can initiate stronger cooperation between Romania and other regional partners to bolster Moldova’s ability to resolve migration pressures, environmental disruptions, and humanitarian crises from Ukrainian immigrants. Besides, the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) by NATO would offer training initiatives needed by young Moldovan professionals and civil servants (NATO, 2025). The DEEP program will contribute to institutional resilience in Moldova. Moreover, the staff-to-staff interactions in energy, transport, digital infrastructure, and space could be intensified by making the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure available in Moldova. Finally, by using the Maritime Centre of the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure that functions within the Maritime Command in the UK, Moldova can gain access to the network of communication of information and best practices by the involved actors (Monaghan, 2023). The access to the network supports information sharing and best practices among relevant actors. 

Resilience is a strategic necessity of Moldova due to the vulnerability of the country to energy and geopolitics, hybrid threats, and institutional weaknesses. The Moldovan context, even though neutral, requires the participation of NATO to break the cycle of disinformation campaigns, energy reliance, cyber-attacks, and political interference. The closeness to Ukraine in the case of the Russian invasion makes the intervention of NATO critical to strengthen Moldova against the crisis and the sustainability of its governance and other essential services. In addition to securing the critical infrastructure, NATO is able to engage in a comprehensive intervention of civil preparedness, economic stability, and governance reform.

Further Reading on E-International Relations